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THE NEW-CHURCH REVIEW

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THE
NEW-CHURCH REVIEW

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JUSTICE

BY GERTRUDE CROWNFIELD

WHETHER or not it is everywhere fully understood what truly constitutes it, nevertheless, justice is the theme of the world today,—justice between nations, justice in the social order, justice between individuals.

Justice is no new theme, for justice is as old as the history of mankind,—as old as the history of the Infinite; yet, being a continuous outgoing from the Lord God Himself, it is ever new as well as ever old. Therefore justice is a basic and eternal principle. Being this, if we would attempt to form right conclusions upon any question whatsoever wherein justice is involved, whether that question be of international or individual import, we need first of all to understand, as completely as human creatures are able to conceive of it, the nature of justice as it flows out from the Divine.

The late Rev. John Worcester significantly said that the Lord's Divine justice consists in providing man with every needed help in the process of salvation and regeneration, and that this justice to fallen and perverted man is Divine mercy. It is His Divine justice, then, that places within reach of all His creatures sources of instruction, in the

form of revelation, teachings from the Scriptures, the inner dictate flowing directly from Himself, the guidance and direction of wise laws, the encouragement and inspiration of noble example, or friendly help, of opportunities for increasing usefulness. Even the unregenerate cannot drift beyond all reach of these, or fail to reap the benefits flowing from them, except by reason of their own deliberate closing of the door upon them. Nevertheless, on the other side of that shut door, the Divine mercy waits, with these benefits and opportunities. "Behold I stand at the door, and knock. If any man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me." It is Divine mercy that constantly endeavors through human instruments to provide means for the correction and reclaiming of the outlaws from justice, and make of them useful members of society and potential angels.

It is impossible to introduce this important subject adequately without speaking also of judgment, because the two, as we shall see, are inseparable companions. Nay, more, they are not at all to be distinguished into two separate forces in their first emanation from the Divine, because at the point nearest to Him they are so perfectly adjusted the one to the other, so closely wedded, that they are absolutely one in action. Hence to divorce them in our thoughts, or in our use of them, would be to leave out half of what should be a balanced whole.

We are well aware that the two great attributes of the Divine Nature are Divine Love and Divine Wisdom. Perhaps we do not always keep clearly before us that these two attributes in their working are called justice and judgment, and that their joint operation constitutes that Divine Providence that rules in all the affairs of mankind from generals even down to the most minute particulars.

In the work on "Divine Providence" we read:

> The Divine Providence in the reformation, regeneration, and salvation of mankind partakes equally of the divine love and the divine wisdom: from an excess of either man could not be reformed, regenerated, and saved. The divine love is willing to save

all, but cannot, except by means of the divine wisdom; and all the laws in accordance with which salvation is effected are from the divine wisdom, and love cannot transcend those laws, because the divine love and wisdom are one, and cannot be separated.

Let us bear in mind as we proceed in our discussion, that the Writings of the Church teach us that justice is synonymous with love, righteousness, mercy, goodness, uprightness, charity, and that judgment has for its synonyms truth, law, faithfulness, wisdom, and that nowhere in the Divine Word is any synonym of love of justice used without immediate mention of its other half, wisdom, or judgment. "Justice and judgment are the habitation of Thy throne; mercy and truth shall go before Thy face."

Now while it is true that nearest to their Divine Source, love working as justice, and wisdom working as judgment, are not to be distinguished as separate entities, we must remember that they flow out to mankind, and that we, as receiving vessels, and having all our life from love and wisdom, proceed, according to the essential differences in our individualities, to separate them more or less distinctly, by taking to ourselves, because of the delight that we find in it, more of the one quality than we do of the other. To some love, good, justice, makes the stronger appeal; to others wisdom, truth, judgment comes with more appealing force.

We are taught that the Lord rules the angels of His celestial kingdom by justice, or good, and that truth is written on their hearts, so that they do not even have to think or reason about it, but put it at once into act, and that His spiritual kingdom is ruled by judgment or truth. If that statement had to do only with conditions as they exist in the other life, I should not quote it here, but it has a very direct bearing upon life in this world, and in its application explains conditions here. The Lord Himself has taught us to pray, "Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven."

These two kingdoms, the celestial and the spiritual, are as the heart and lungs of the body, as the cerebrum and the cerebellum of the brain, as the will and the understanding,

as love and wisdom, linked together, but forever different, performing each of them a separate office, impossible to the other, working for the perfection of the whole, standing for the Divine Love and the Divine Wisdom as they are received by us, and used by us as justice and judgment for the carrying out of the purposes of the Lord Jesus Christ.

"The Apocalypse Explained" states that all judgments are effected from laws and precepts which are truths, and that Divine truth purifies. Divine good or love, which is justice, does not judge anyone, because it explores no one; but Divine truth judges, for it explores everyone. The Lord Himself does not judge anyone from the Divine truth which proceeds from Him, for this is so united to Divine love that they are one; but man judges himself, for it is the Divine truth received by him that judges him. The "Arcana Cœlestia" says:

> The Lord does not judge man, but arranges him, and he is judged according to his reception. To judge denotes truth in its office, and likewise the arrangement of truths.

Since there are, and always will be, these two specific, unchanging types of human beings on this earth as well as in heaven, they must be ruled, explored, ordered and arranged by the two grand principles or attributes by which the Lord governs these two kingdoms in the spiritual world, namely by His justice and His judgment, His good and His truth, that Divine love that never explores or judges, but only puts in order and arranges, and that Divine truth which explores and judges, and the closer these work together for the accomplishment of a common end, the nearer we shall come to bringing about the state wherein the kingdoms of this world shall become the Lord's and His Christ's. The laws of heaven, the laws of heavenly order must prevail upon earth, for no permanent betterment can ever come about until we begin to approximate heavenly law, and heavenly order.

Today the peoples of the world are being brought into closer and closer contact and communication with one an-

other's desires and purposes, their needs, and their hopes. Men from all parts of the world are able to sit down together in council to consider what will be for the best good, not of one nation alone, but for the entire human race. A realization of the existence of such a thing as the Grand Man is coming to pass,—no less. The affairs of that Grand Man are before the bar of justice. In this connection the teachings of our Church have a word to say:

> For the preservation of order in the various societies of mankind, there ought to be persons well skilled in the laws, men of wisdom, having the fear of God.

We cannot but realize that a large majority of the people of today are sunk in material desires, and seeking material ends. What is true of many individuals is true also of nations. That is why it is so hard to bring about a better social order, a better understanding and agreement between nations. In the name of what men call justice each demands as good and preferably much better for himself than for his neighbor. In the name of what men call judgment, each demands that the sword of decision, in its fall, shall carve off for him a larger, better portion than is given to the rest, that to him shall be given the place of the righteous, and to his opponent the place of the sinner. Each fears to yield the smallest portion of what he calls his lawful rights. Thus, in the present unregenerate state of mankind, justice is held in bondage, and judgment walks blindfold.

It is because of this perversion of justice and of judgment that wars arise; and that after actual physical conflict has ceased, a war of minds goes on, each side grappling tenaciously with the other, demanding this sea-port, that boundary, these curtailments of railroad, or mining, or marine activities, everything to be granted by the rival nation, nothing to be yielded by the contestant. It is because of this perversion that captains of industry, heads of great corporations, trades unions banded together for their own protection, stand watchful as hawks, lest some rival manufacturer, some competing corporation, some

employer, snatch from them what they regard as their rightful supremacy. It is a war to the knife in many cases, and this perversion of justice and judgment they term "the adventure of life," and when it bears them down physically they bewail it as "the strain of life." It is a perversion of judgment that makes no discrimination between the one who sins knowingly and deliberately in the full possession of God-given faculties, and the one swept into wrong-doing on the impulse of the moment, or through the distorted workings of an undeveloped and retarded intelligence, or a diseased mind. It is a perversion of justice that herds one and all of these fallen ones into close companionship in which those first entering upon the downward path come under the daily influence of the hardened criminals; that provides no uplifting, no wholesome opportunity for useful activity, or for laying the foundations of life anew in a better way, or for developing the stunted nature, or for breaking the bonds of mental disease. It is a perversion of justice that permits the little child, the undeveloped boy or girl, to work beyond their powers, and to be forced into fields of labor that should be reserved for later years. So we might go on, multiplying illustrations in every walk and field of life. It is for each one of us to make the concrete applications of the great abstract principles.

Before the order of heaven can dawn upon the world, before crying wrongs can be righted, judgment must come, judgment that is truth. The torch of truth must be lifted to cast light into dark places, revealing the sinister forces that lurk there, operating consistently for evil ends. The sword of truth must fall, separating good from evil, piercing through deceptions, sophistries, and all hypocrisies. Truth must come as the great solvent, purifying the wine of life from its defiling dregs. This is judgment. Who would dare to say that in this new age, with its new freedom, its new light given from heaven, that judgment is not already operating? Who will dare to say that under the

influence of this steadily growing light, from heaven, the veil will not fall from the eyes of blinded judgment, and the bonds be loosed from justice?

Have there not sprung up in some quarters, at least, definite movements for the betterment of the conditions that govern mankind: prison reform, the separate and individual training of the unfit, unremitting endeavor to search out the causes of crime, and its relation to disease, and to meet these situations helpfully, and with enlightened sympathy and understanding? Is there not a real effort on the part of an increasing number of great and good men and women,—statesmen, philanthropists, scientists, religious leaders, people in all ranks and walks of life, to meet human needs in a better way, to minister to body, mind, and spirit by coupling clear judgment with far-reaching and healing justice?

These which follow are the conditions upon which justice and judgment must rest, as upon sure foundations: justice and judgment will never prevail upon earth until men and women come into the image and likeness of God. To become an image and likeness of God! How much these two involve of growth in knowledge of truth and a life according to it, in power on the part of each to see his neighbor's side, in loving endeavor to help him in his needs and his struggles, to intensify for him every happiness that takes its rise in good sources, to promote his usefulness and the carrying out of his aspirations, hopes and desires when they are worthy, as well as one's own, to lay down one's own desires and hopes when they conflict with the good of the whole. Can men and women be images and likenesses of God, and not have as the result a glorious revolution, the world over? It would bring in a millennial day, of course, when the nations of the world meet harmoniously together, and in a spirit of true unity make mutual concessions, work out laws for the governance of the whole that will yet regard the rights and necessities of the individual nations, and still leave them free to regulate in-

dividual matters that do not conflict with the good of all; wherein each will have found and developed its true field of use, and will follow its activities, giving the product of them without a spirit of cut-throat rivalry; wherein the rights and needs of the weak are as sacredly guarded and provided for as those of the strong; wherein employer and employee have one another's good at heart; wherein the place of the child, the young person, the middle-aged, the old, all have their true place in the economy of life, each walking therein gladly, giving an integral and indispensable contribution to the whole. That day may be as yet afar off, but the Lord intends that that millennial day shall, in the fullness of time, dawn, for He has pictured it for us in the vision of the New Jerusalem coming down from Himself out of Heaven. It will draw near, and can only draw near, as each one of us progresses in the regenerate life. I have, as an individual, and so have you, a concrete responsibility for hastening that day; and we meet and carry that responsibility adequately when we lead the life of use in accordance with the following words:

> So far as man does from love what wisdom teaches, he is an image of God. Whoever from the Lord loves justice and does it with judgment is charity in its image and likeness, and a judge who regards justice only and administers it with judgment possesses conscience.

Hence, we must not allow ourselves to be guided by the impulses or emotions of the will alone, however good, and kind, and loving, but by the regulating, clarifying, illuminating power of truth in the understanding as well. Neither should we come under the sway of the keen, cold, searching light of the intellect alone, but its findings and decisions should be warmed and tempered and permeated by the gentle, merciful influence of good love in the heart. How often have we not grieved over the failures that have been ours, when under the influence of kindly impulse, springing from a warm heart and overflowing affection, we have rushed into act before we have consulted judgment and been guided by wisdom! How often, too, we have

gone sadly astray when pursuing some hard and icy course that judgment has pointed out when we have taken counsel of truth alone, divorced from the good that would have tempered it with gentleness and sympathy! These two, justice and judgment, are heavenly yoke-fellows, heavenly mates, true and beauteous partners, and it must be our constant effort to wed them ever more completely in our every thought and act.

Whatever may be asked in the name of justice, whatever may be executed in the way of judgment, will demand as the unchanging law of its efficient operation for good, a keeping of the letter and the spirit of the Ten Commandments. These are the spiritual laws that rule the heavens, and have been given to us on earth for our guidance in national affairs as well as in individual affairs, in matters temporal as well as matters spiritual. These lifted up above the seething of selfish desires and demands, these looked to and obeyed above the turmoil and the strife of falsifying tongues have power to bring us to a peaceful and ordered working together for the common good, and to make the citizens of the world as one people, one nation in the sight of the Lord. Some lives will always lay their strongest emphasis upon good. Others will rejoice more intensely in the truth. This does not mean that the ones who love good best will ignore truth as a means, nor that the ones who delight in truth will disregard good as the end to be sought.

In the future, as in the past, it will for a long time be true that the process of elevating mankind as a whole to a nobler, to a regenerated state, will be slow, that the correction of wide-spread and long-standing wrongs will be gradual, but the Lord will always provide fore-runners, men and women of vision or judgment, and of a burning ardent love and demand for the establishment of justice. These will steadfastly point the way to the slower and reluctant masses, these will carry the standard unflincingly farther on and higher up.

And in days to come, though they may be yet afar off, the blessed prophecy will be fulfilled:

> When Thy judgments are in the earth, the inhabitants of the world will learn righteousness. And the work of righteousness shall be peace, and the effect of righteousness quietness and assurance forever.

It rests with each one of us, by our individual regeneration, by our forward and upward trend, to hasten the great day wherein "The kingdoms of this world are become the Lord's and His Christ's, and He shall reign forever and ever. Amen."

GERTRUDE CROWNFIELD.

THE APOSTOLIC WRITINGS: THEIR USE TO THE NEW CHURCH.

By the Rev. John Daboll.

LAST summer five New-Church people were gathered about a table, four of them children of New-Church ministers, one of them a New-Church minister, all of them brought up in New-Church families and in New-Church Sunday Schools, and all of them regular attendants at New-Church services. The youngest one in the party remarked that she thought it was a shame that a girl should have to go to college before becoming acquainted with the inspiring Thirteenth Chapter of First Corinthians:

Though I speak with the tongue of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing. And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing.

Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.

Love never faileth: but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away. When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish things. For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known. And now abideth faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love.

The general feeling in our party was that a familiarity with the great chapters in the apostolic writings would be very helpful to the life of New Churchmen. Who can doubt that if we thoroughly appreciated the truth conveyed in this great chapter in First Corinthians that we would be much more powerful helpers in our various communities? So I was moved to make a study of the relation which the apostolic writings bear to the New Church.

At the very outset I am impressed with the fact that the basic teaching of the New Church is that God is Love and that in the apostolic writings this is as clearly stated as anywhere in the Bible:

> Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God: for God is love. (I John 4:7, 8).

Take this teaching in connection with the cry of the Psalmist:

> God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this; that power belongeth unto God. Also unto thee, O, Lord, belongeth mercy: for thou renderest to every man according to his work. (62: 11, 12.)

and we see plainly the source of any power which we may have.

But there were other reasons which prompted a study of this subject. A long discussion at the recent meeting of the American New-Church Sunday School Association at Cincinnati actually centred on this subject, for it had to do with the question of our adopting the schedule of Sunday School lessons arranged by the International Lesson Committee which includes these books. Dr. King of Cleveland writes the notes on the International Lessons which appear in the *Helper,* and he favored the adoption of that schedule for our Sunday Schools. When such a staunch student of the New-Church teachings favors such a course, it seems as if there must be reasons for a careful consideration of the grounds on which we have felt it best to

continue a separate course of lessons. I feel however that in this paper I should limit myself to the subject as stated, and not go off into the path which I might be tempted to follow, if I discussed courses for New-Church Sunday Schools.

Still another incentive to study this subject came when one of our parishioners expressed keen regret that her children have never had instruction about those books of the Bible which are so frequently used by ministers of the Christian Church (as distinguished from the New Church).

So I venture to present (to this very representative gathering of New Churchmen) some results of my study of the question with the sincere hope that you will all give it your best thought, and that we may all profit by the discussion so that we may be more effective carriers of the New-Church message of love to a world which so sorely needs it.

I wonder how much we have been deterred from studying the apostolic writings by the fact that Swedenborg makes a clear distinction between them and the parts of the Bible which are written in the "style of the Word." The differentiation is in effect to raise certain parts of the Bible to a level of power and potential usefulness that in a way casts a shadow on the rest of the Bible. And yet a careful reading of Swedenborg's teachings on this subject leaves one with the thought that we may not be justified in neglecting the study of the apostolic writings, but rather that we may derive decided benefit from such study. The distinction which he makes between the books "of the Word" and the other books of the Bible in no way diminishes the use of the other books of the Bible, although exalting the use of the books "of the Word."

The plain surrounding a mountain has its particular use, and there is no reason for making invidious comparisons between the uses of the mountain and of the plain respectively.

Swedenborg's statements about the apostolic writings are

interesting and instructive. First I will quote the letter to Dr. Beyer on the character of the apostolic writings:

With regard to the writings of St. Paul and the other Apostles, I have not given them a place in my "Arcana Cœlestia," because they are dogmatic writings merely, and not written in the style of the Word, like those of the Prophets, of David, of the Evangelists, and the Revelation of St. John. The style of the Word consists throughout of correspondences, and thence effects an immediate communication with heaven; but the style of these dogmatic writings is quite different, having indeed communication with heaven, but only mediate or indirect. The reason why the Apostles wrote in this style was that the Christian church was then to begin through them; and the style that is used in the Word would not have been suitable for such doctrinal tenets, which required plain and simple language adapted to the capacities of all readers. Nevertheless the writings of the Apostles are excellent books for the church, since they insist on the doctrine of charity, and faith thence; as the Lord Himself has done in the Gospels and in the Revelation of St. John, which will clearly appear to any one who studies these writings with attention. (Letter to Dr. Beyer, quoted in Warren's Compendium, p. 124.)

From this letter it appears that these writings are in a style, "having indeed communication with heaven, but only mediate or indirect." It is also significant that "such doctrinal tenets" . . . "required plain and simple language adapted to the capacities of all readers." Therefore it would seem that we have before us in the apostolic writings a statement of "doctrinal tenets" "in plain and simple language adapted to the capacities of all readers."

This is so important a point that lacking a copy of the letter in the language which Swedenborg used in writing to Dr. Beyer I venture to repeat the latter part of this quotation as translated in Potts's Concordance under the term "Epistle":

They were written thus by the Apostles that the new Christian church might be commenced through them: wherefore matters of doctrine could not be written in the style of the word, but they had to be expressed in such a manner as to be understood more clearly and intimately. The writings of the Apostles, nevertheless, are good books of the church, insisting upon the doctrine of charity

and faith as strongly as the Lord Himself has done in the Gospels and the Book of Revelation; as may be seen and found evident by everyone who in reading them directs his attention to these points. (Document 224.)

That seems to me a strong statement in favor of our paying more attention to the teachings of the apostolic writings. From the standpoint of evolution or development it is reasonable to assume that even today we may in our Christian experience go through stages analogous to those through which the early fathers passed and find great help in a perusal of the writings which aided them in understanding these doctrines "clearly and intimately."

There is a passage in the Spiritual Diary (n. 4824) which seems not to be in exact agreement with the foregoing but it may be that the explanation is that Swedenborg is distinguishing between "those who are of the church" and "Paul":

That the Epistles of Paul have not an internal sense, is known in the other life; but it has been permitted that they should be in the church lest those who are of the church should do evil to the word of the Lord . . . For if a man lives evilly and still believes the holy Word, he does evil to heaven; therefore the Epistles of Paul have been permitted; and therefore Paul was not allowed to take a single parable, and not even a doctrine, from the Lord, and to expound and explain it, but he took all things from himself. The church does indeed explain the Word of the Lord, but by means of the Epistles of Paul; wherefore, also it everywhere recedes from the good of charity, and accepts the truth of faith.

The hand of Providence is evident in permitting these Epistles to be in the church, as also in not permitting Paul to "take a single parable and not even a doctrine from the Lord, and to expound and explain it." But it is conceivable that we in the New Church may be much more useful, if we can, from a knowledge of the Epistles from the standpoint of the revelation made to the New Church, show how the Epistles agree or disagree with the doctrines of the New Church.

An interesting fact stated by Swedenborg is "I have

conversed with Paul for an entire year; and also on the subject of what he wrote in Romans III. 8." This passage is: "Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law." It is useless to speculate what Swedenborg's influence may have been on Paul in the course of conversation for an entire year, but the fact that in several of his works he refers to this passage as the basis of the church doctrine which is false because the passage is "falsely understood" indicates that he did not consider Paul the promulgator of the "false doctrine," even if, as Swedenborg says, Paul took all things from himself.

As indicating a method of study of the Epistles in the light of the New Church, let me call to your attention Swedenborg's statement in "Divine Providence" (n. 115):

> Those who are in faith separate from charity, and have confirmed themselves therein from the saying of Paul to the Romans, "that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law" adore this saying as those who adore the sun, and become like those who, fixing their eyes steadily upon the sun, whereby the sight becomes dim, do not see anything in the midst of light; for they do not see what is understood there by the deeds of the law; that they are not the commandments of the decalogue, but the rituals described by Moses in his books, which are everywhere there called the law; and, therefore, lest the commandments of the decalogue should be understood, he explains it by saying, "Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law" (v. 31). Those who, from the above saying, have confirmed themselves in faith separate from charity, by looking at the passage as at the sun, do not see where Paul enumerates the laws of faith, that they are the very works of charity; and what is faith without laws? Neither do they see where he enumerates evil works, saying that those who do them cannot enter into heaven. From which it is evident, how much blindness is induced from this one passage misunderstood.

If we had time it would be an interesting inquiry to study why Swedenborg makes so little use of the Acts and the Epistles in his exposition. He in a way answers the question in his letter to Dr. Beyer. We find evidence, however, that he made a most thorough study of the Acts and the Epistles; for in the little work, to which the name *Dicta*

Probantia was given by Dr. Im. Tafel, are many references to these books arranged under suitable headings, such as The Apostles, Miracles, Christ, God the Father, The Holy Spirit, The Coming of the Lord, The Consummation, The New Church, Christ, The Judgment, and sixteen others. These references are instructive summaries of the meanings of the verses noted. If we were making a study of the Acts and of the Epistles these summaries would be invaluable as indicating a method of approach.

It is surprising that in the New Church we have not made more use of the Acts and the Epistles, when our leading authority on Sunday School work, our honored President of Convention, Rev. William L. Worcester, says in the valuable "Sower Notes," p. 383:

> The Acts and the Epistles are not books of the Lord's Word; they do not have the continuous spiritual meaning which the books of the Word have: but they are most useful books of Christian teaching, and are especially precious as being the account of the ministry of those who had been with the Lord, and of others who learned directly from the Lord's disciples. . . . In reading the Book of Acts we shall remember the distinction between it and the Gospels. We shall value it for its simple narrative of the first Christian workers, and for its teaching of Christian doctrine.

The testimony of others as to the value of Acts is illuminating. The Century Bible quotes Schäfer as saying: "Acts is no history of the Apostles, but an apology for the church"; and J. Weiss as saying:

> I cannot understand "Acts" except as a defense of the Christian religion before the Gentiles against the denunciation of the Jews, which is meant to show how Christianity, with its mission to the world, has proved to be the annulling of Judaism. The author regards Paul as the representative of the cause which he himself is advocating, namely, the Gentile Christian church of his own day, and he wishes to describe how this church came to spread itself over the whole Empire irresistibly. In his representation of the history, he has no animus against Jewish *Christianity,* far less against Peter or James. What he is absorbed in is the breach with Judaism; for in Judaism he sees the real opponent of Christianity.

This view has interesting implications in confirmation of the teachings of the New Church that the Jewish Church had come to an end. Particularly does it militate against the view which we frequently find advanced today that Jesus Christ was the highest development of the Jewish Church. A study of Acts would be useful to see if the view of Weiss can be successfully maintained.

Prof. J. Vernon Bartlett in his opening paragraph on the "Value and Literary Characteristics" of "Acts" sententiously summarizes its character:

> As to the importance of the Book of Acts there can be no question. If Luke's Gospel has a claim to be called "the most beautiful book that has ever been written," it is safe to say that its sequel is a book of unique interest and value. It has no fellow within the New Testament or without it: the so-called Apocryphal Acts of certain Apostles but serve to enforce this statement, as well as witness to the impression produced by our Acts as a type of edifying literature. It is the one really primitive church history, primitive in spirit as well as in substance. Drop it out, and what should we know in a connected, that is in an historical way, touching the most momentous epoch of the church's life. With Acts, Paul's letters are indeed priceless materials for history, as well as perennial founts of inspiration: but without it, they would remain bafflingly fragmentary and incomplete, if not misleading. For it is to Acts that we owe the perspective of the Apostolic Age. Those who have despised its guidance have produced abstractions which they have confidently styled 'Paulinism'; but they have lost the power to give a constructive account of Apostolic Christianity as a whole. Of that the essential truth of the picture in Acts is the prerequisite. And it is increasingly found to afford a harmonious background for the Pauline letters, when once we realize that Paul was a great missionary, emphasizing certain aspects of his Gospel in particular ways as need (polemical or expository) arose, and not merely as a theologian, with his message in a uniform dogmatic mould; and when once we take Acts as what it claims to be, viz. an honest history, involving several theological circles, written by a man of singular capacity for recording each situation as felt by the actors themselves.

Surely it is worth while for us in the New Church to know thoroughly the historical setting of the growth of the Christian church. Religion and life are universals which

repeat over and over again. A study of history is valuable only as it contributes to an understanding of life and religion. Where better can we study history than in the documents which have come down to us from the earliest Christian times. The first Epistle of Paul, First Thessalonians, was probably written not more than twenty-five years after the Resurrection of the Lord; the Acts not more than forty-five years after. So we have almost contemporary reactions to the preaching of the Gospel and the efforts of the Lord's Apostles.

Another reason for New-Church study of the apostolic writings is the general use of them in the Christian Church. If that use makes for a Christian life, we should surely understand its basis and implications. If that use is not favorable to a Christian life, we should be in a position to understand its departure from true Christian principles.

A thorough knowledge of the apostolic writings will give us points of contact with friends in the Christian Church, whereas our lack of knowledge and seeming lack of interest in these writings is a factor separating us from those whose friendship we should court, whose sympathy we should strive for, whose welfare we should seek.

I have used the term "Christian Church" in contradistinction to the term New Church or Church of the New Jerusalem to avoid any invidious suggestions or comparisons. The Lord works through every means possible and His Providence is over all. We should therefore welcome every effort which is manifested to do His will on earth as it is in heaven.

So plainly and simply put are many of the doctrines contained in the apostolic writings that the most unlearned of us can comprehend them and put them in practice. For instance, the following passages:

> In everything by prayer and supplication with thanksgiving let your requests be made known unto God. And the peace of God which passeth understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just,

whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things. (Phil. 4:6-9.)

Now we exhort you, brethren, warn them that are unruly, comfort the feebleminded, support the weak, be patient toward all. See that none render evil for evil unto any man: but ever follow that which is good, both among yourselves, and to all. Rejoice evermore. Pray without ceasing. In everything give thanks: for this is the will of God in Christ Jesus concerning you. Quench not the spirit. Despise not prophesyings. Prove all things; hold fast that which is good. Abstain from all appearances of evil. And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. (II Thess. 5:14-23.)

Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this. To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world. (Jas. 1:27.)

There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love. We love Him because He first loved us. If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And this commandment have we from Him, That he who loveth God love His brother also. (I John 4: 18-21.)

It is therefore evident that the apostolic writings are of use to the New Church, and that we should plan to make them of use. It is easily conceivable that in the Sunday School a study can be made which will show how the principles and truths of the word of God worked out in practice in the establishment of the Christian Church. They are so universal that comparisons may be made of the life to-day with the life of nineteen centuries ago.

In conclusion I would summarize the points which I have tried to make:

1st. Swedenborg clearly teaches that the apostolic writings are excellent books for the church.

2nd. As we pass through the same experiences in our individual lives that the church passed through at its initiation so may we learn to shape our conduct in accordance with the record of those experiences.

3rd. A knowledge of the teachings of the apostolic writings furnishes us with points of mental and spiritual contact with the churches about us. If our children really appreciated the beauties of these teachings and found them helpful in their daily lives, one barrier would be removed which now unnecessarily separates them from sympathy with their associates.

Although the time may not come when we shall experience the thrills which the early followers of the Lord felt, there are not lacking signs that such experiences are not foreign to our own times as witness the reception of the New Church in Japan, the Philippines, and Africa. Would that it might be written of our times as it was written of the day of Pentecost:

> Then they that gladly received his word were baptized: and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand souls. And they continued steadfastly in the Apostles' doctrine and fellowship, and in breaking of bread, and in prayers. And fear came upon every soul: and many wonders and signs were done by the Apostles. And all that believed were together, and had all things common; and sold their goods, and parted them to all, as every man had need. And they, continuing daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart, praising God, and having favour with all the people. And the Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved. (Acts 2:41-47.)

JOHN DABOLL.

RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

By J. David Larson.

IT has been my experience, both prior to my finding Swedenborg as well as since becoming a member of the New Church, that everywhere people are looking for light such as Swedenborg has given the world; that not only is his philosophy acceptable, but that it will be eagerly absorbed when intelligently presented.

There are, no doubt, many avenues of approach to those who are hungering for these truths, but, certainly, one of the most important channels through which new adherents can be reached is through Swedenborg's psychology. It is this phase of Swedenborg to which I shall address myself at this time. I have no illusions that I can do justice to this subject as evolved by the great mind of Swedenborg. I can but offer my small share of appreciation of his work.

That particular volume of his writings entitled "Rational Psychology" is well named; but rational may also be said of that portion of his psychology developed after he was illuminated, for his entire psychology is indeed the most rational, as well as the most practical, that has ever come to my attention; I would venture to say, that has ever been produced.

What a stupendous amount of work he laid down as a foundation to the production of the book "Rational Psychology"! His "Economy of the Animal Kingdom," in two great volumes, a production which alone would have been sufficient as a life work for the average man, was merely a preliminary to his search for the soul. It is true that he included in the "Economy of the Animal Kingdom" an "Introduction to Rational Psychology," but he eventually discovered that the time had not then come for an adequate

exposition of the subject. He frankly acknowledged the prematurity of his announcement of such a contemplated work by saying,

> I could not but think, with mankind in general, that all our knowledge of it [the soul] was to be attempted by a bare reasoning philosophy, or more immediately, by the anatomy of the human body. But upon making the attempt, I found myself as far from my object as ever, for no sooner did I seem to have mastered the subject, than I found it again eluding my grasp, though it never absolutely disappeared from my view. Thus, my hopes were not destroyed but deferred.

The search for the soul was thus the real and inspiring motive of all of Swedenborg's labors in this field. His writings disclose that he possessed not alone a tremendous industry and great logic; he was broad enough in his outlook to examine without bias or prejudice the labors and theories of all other workers in the same field with whom he came into touch.

That he realized the extreme difficulties of his task becomes evident from a brief treatise entitled, "The Way to a Knowledge of the Soul," which I quote here verbatim, for the reason that it gives a good insight into the workings of Swedenborg's mind at this stage.

> Several years have elapsed since I first conceived the design of working out the problems of Rational Psychology, or of investigating the essence and faculties of the human soul and internal senses; but hitherto the extreme difficulty of the subject, and the vast amount of preliminary knowledge which is requisite, have warned me against treading prematurely in this direction; for many things must be first clearly expounded and arranged in order. Certain it is that those who are but superficially informed in the elements of the sciences, or even well acquainted with one or two branches, and who notwithstanding dare to enter upon this field, because of their ignorance of the many and sometimes of the leading means, will but exert an unprofitable subtlety for the most part on empty questions, and only discuss ingenious trifles; and according to their natural endowments which are enlightened, or as it often happens, obscured by a few sciences, they will involve an important subject in thorny discussions, which can have no effect upon the brains, but to occasion disputes which a judge will in vain try to

settle, on account of the trivial nature of the matter upon which the acumen and subtlety are expended.

The present subject, however, is too important to be so treated; it is no arena for foils, but for naked weapons. To complete the single science of the soul, all the sciences are required that the world has ever eliminated or developed. If any shall undertake the task with less than all, it must be with the certainty of discovering in the end that he is destitute of the instruments, and unequal to the toils of so vast a work. The points which he requires, but of which unhappily he is ignorant, he must perforce obtain from himself or produce by the keenness of his own mind; that is to say, he must use his imagination to supply the place of real knowledge; and how prone to error the imagination is if left to her own guidance, without the companionship of experience and the precepts of a true philosopher, is perfectly well known to even the least experienced. Let the reader only make the attempt for a short distance, and he will soon find himself retreating with his standards, and obliged to bring up fresh supplies, so that he may with increased forces make attempts of this kind.

2. If we wish to deserve success in this study, it will in the first place be necessary to spare no pains, but to exert the mind to the utmost, in clearing and winning those things which closely surround and are subordinate to the subject in hand. The anatomical scrutiny of animal bodies, and especially of the cerebrum, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, and spinal marrow, and also of the nerves, must open the doors which lead to it. Without a thorough command of these portals, it is in vain to hope to penetrate the recesses of nature's temple. It is impossible to divine what nature is in the invisible sphere, excepting from what she is in the visible; or what she is in causes, excepting from what she is in those effects which ultimately strike some one of the senses. Just so it is impossible to know the nature of the inner action of the mind, without examining the face of the mind, that is to say, without investigating the brains and the marrows of the mind. And even then it will still be impossible to guess how the soul unfolds her forces, without having studied the connections of all the viscera of the body, as well as the organs of the external senses, which contribute in their degree to enable those of the internal senses to undergo that development which will open them to the soul.

3. 'Nature exists in totality in leasts,' as Malpighi well observes in his treatise on the silkworm. Whatever is presented to the eyes and to the organs of the senses, consists of a series of things beginning with leasts and multiplied through many degrees or stages, and which at length, after they attain to a certain considerable magnitude, appear to us as the least of things; in con-

sequence of which it is usual at first to regard them as boundaries and causes, though far from being this, they but mask the real causes; hence nothing further is to be hoped for from them than that they will supply the mind with ultimate effects, from which it may pass to principles by an analysis of its own; besides which they are the only means that the mind can judge from per nexum (or by relation). The path, however, is difficult and steep. If we confine ourselves to a few facts and phenomena, we form an idea of causes in conformity with these alone; though nothing is confirmed, unless all things which relate to the subject both nearly and remotely also give their consent to the same effect. And when the truth is found consent is never absent, for all calculations support it. All things in the world are connected, because all things spring from a single most universal principle. Hence the truth on no subject which is examined can be said to be declared, unless all things hasten to give their consent. And thus whatever results we are now to arrive at in treating of the brain must be confirmed by all that depends upon that brain, that is to say, by the whole body, including all the viscera, organs, parts, solids and fluids; also by the records of disease, whether of the body or the animus; and furthermore by the details of experimental chemistry and physics, and all the other parts, inasmuch as animal nature in her domain passes in the most perfect manner through all the arts to obtain the effects she desires. Such is the connection of all the sciences requisite to explore the powers of the animal machine alone, that the absence of but one of them is sufficient to deprive the chain of the link which suspends it, or to leave it too feeble to bear any weight.

4. Nor is it enough to acquire a knowledge of all the sciences or even of rational philosophy in its various departments, unless we can reduce all things to higher and higher generalizations, or form one philosophy of all of them, sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all. The one philosophy to which we allude, and which we denominate the Mathematical Philosophy of Universals, although hitherto unknown to the world, is still of possible attainment; and it is our wish, if ease and tranquility of mind be granted, ourselves to lay its foundation. Without its assistance it is idle to hope to arrive at a knowledge of the soul; for it is the very philosophy, not of the mind, but of the soul (the mind is to be developed up to the soul, which latter admits of no development); in other words, it is the analysis whereby the soul comprehends its own objects. As however this philosophy, as we said before, is altogether unknown, and it will therefore perhaps be thought fruitless to endeavor to acquire it; so before we give a statement of its principles, we shall by no means venture dogmatically to

declare its use; but shall be content with observing that without its help, it will be easier to reach the moon than to explore the soul.

It was this profound quality of reasoning which ultimately enabled Swedenborg to re-discover the lost knowledge of the Doctrine of Correspondences. I say "lost knowledge" with reservations, for a certain knowledge of Correspondences has at all times been handed down through the ages in the teachings of symbolism and in mythology.

While his thoroughgoing scientific studies in anatomy, physiology, psychology, and similar subjects served as a basis for his reasoning on the soul, he gradually became aware of the fact that the external phenomena of the physical body bore a specific relationship to the human soul, which by means of the Doctrine of Correspondences furnished the key, not only to an understanding of the Intercourse between the Soul and Body, but to a deeper understanding of the relationship of spiritual to natural things.

In "Rational Psychology," an impressive work of more than 350 pages, Swedenborg presents an extremely interesting and comprehensive dissertation on human nature. It is characterized by a clearness and a fullness that make it virtually encyclopedic in its scope. That he fell short of his quest in actually finding the soul was undoubtedly the Divine purpose, for there was to be a field of far greater usefulness for Swedenborg than to be merely the discoverer of the human soul.

His arduous labors in the pursuit of the soul involved so thorough and so rigid a training of all of his intellectual faculties that he thus became eminently fitted to be the bearer of the most marvelous message which humanity of the present era has ever received—the harmonious and logical interpretation of the inner meaning of the Scriptures, through which interpretation we have a truly consistent guide and criterion for our faith and our conduct not only on this earth but for the life to come.

In order to appreciate Swedenborg's complete psychology, it is necessary that we follow him in his illuminated period,

when his spiritual senses were opened, for the "revealed" facts of his psychology are even more sublime than are any of his scientifically or naturally discovered psychological truths. We shall see that these Divinely revealed truths are thoroughly in accord with the Laws of Correspondence. The knowledge Swedenborg gives us concerning the subconscious mind, the spiritual mind, and the soul, as we find it in the "Arcana" and others of his theological writings, present a much more satisfactory basis for the application of his principles than would be derived from his "Rational Psychology" alone, great as that work is.

There is the same harmony and consistency in the psychology as found in the "Arcana," as characterizes his earlier scientific works. Here is presented to us a clearly stated exposition of all that constitutes the natural body, the spiritual body, the mind and the soul.

In his description of the external natural and the internal natural minds we are impressed with the sense of authority with which he writes. Consequently, we cannot but realize that herein is the most complete, the most comprehensive, the most satisfactory and satisfying knowledge of the conscious mind, the subconscious mind, the higher minds with man, and the human soul, that has ever been given to the human family. In the clarity of Swedenborg's statements there is no begging of the question; no hypothetical premises to be guessed at.

Throughout Swedenborg's psychology we are led to see the co-ordinate relationship between the mind and the body; that neither is emphasized to the disparagement of the other. It is the same equality that Ruskin observed when he said,

> The basest thought possible concerning man is that he has no spiritual nature; and the foolishest misunderstanding of him possible is, that he has, or should have, no animal nature. For his nature is nobly animal, nobly spiritual—coherently and irrevocably so; neither part of it may, but at its peril, expel, despise, or defy the other.

Throughout the whole of Swedenborg's psychology we are taught that there is no possibility of evading one's per-

sonal responsibility to one's self, to the neighbor, or to the Creator. Many modern psychologists, on the other hand, make seductive appeals which lure thousands of individuals because the element of personal responsibility and moral accountability is entirely swept aside, does not enter into their system of thought, in fact, does not even exist. Swedenborg, however, teaches us that everything that we have ever done, heard, said, thought or felt, that has in it anything of affection, makes its impress on our internal natural mind—the mind which we take with us into the spiritual world, and which becomes active there. Hence, we shall indeed be accountable for all of our acts, thoughts, desires, and affections. Swedenborg gives us a clearly stated explanation of how the records of the internal mind react upon us during this life, from which it becomes clear why regeneration is necessary, to avoid being actuated by evil or selfish impulses which originate on the spiritual side of life and operate on us through our subconscious mind.

The modern psychologist would have us believe that the subconscious mind is a veritable reservoir of power, an inexhaustible source of supply of everything we need as to happiness, success, prosperity and health; that by tapping this vast reservoir we may have anything we like. Seductive appeals of this kind have brought hundreds of thousands of dollars into the pockets of the exponents of flamboyant psychology. It is claimed that, only last spring, in Boston, one such individual derived an income of many thousands of dollars in a few weeks. The flamboyant psychologist has done for psychology what certain fanatical evangelists have done in religion; he has made use of pyrotechnics to attract the people to his system of suggestion, auto-suggestion, and so-called psychological practice. One writer has said that the flamboyant psychologist has so distorted psychology and all that was originally included by the term that it will probably be necessary to coin a new word to convey what was originally intended.

Then, on the other hand, there is the materialistic psy-

chologist who sees in the phenomena of psychology nothing but mechanistic reactions. To him, such a thing as a soul is inconceivable, because it cannot be demonstrated by his particular process of analysis or experiment. Swedenborg's truly rational psychology saves us from the gloomy atmosphere of such materialism and brings us into the clear day of spiritual light. He tells us what is the nature of spirit; that we are, indeed, spiritual beings; that all our life is derived from the source of all life, the Lord; that as human souls we are merely recipients—receiving instruments of that light and power which constitute our spiritual energies.

The development of the radio should facilitate for us the imparting of Swedenborg's philosophy, and especially of his psychology. For just as the radio is a receiving instrument that may be tuned to receive messages from various broadcasting stations, so too, the human mind is a receiving organ for broadcasting stations in the spiritual world. In accordance with the peculiar quality of our spiritual receiving organs, we develop individuality, personality and character; or, to quote Swedenborg,

> Life is one only, and is not creatable; but it is in the highest degree capable of inflowing into forms organically adapted for reception.
>
> Life is the inmost activity of Love and Wisdom, which is God.

This means that the better our receiving organs are developed for the reception of love and wisdom which come to us by influx—both general and particular—the higher will be our aims, our purposes; and the more truly do we live. And, as a human radio, the more intelligently we learn how to tune in for the reception of direct influx, the clearer realization will we have of our relationship to God and to our fellow man.

Swedenborg's psychology is not difficult to explain. There is nothing perplexing in these principles to seekers after the truth, even though they may never before have known of the existence of the New Church. This is because Sweden-

borg has given us definite and specific principles, and, further, because all of his statements bear the unmistakable impress of authority—the Highest Authority—that makes his philosophy comprehensible to those seeking the light; for the mark of truth is simplicity.

I wish to merely touch upon another phase of Swedenborg's psychology which has made a most profound appeal to me; one which has proved the most practical in application. I refer to that phase of Swedenborg which involves spiritual healing.

It is indeed true that we can find in Swedenborg's writings no specific treatise on the subject of spiritual healing. The elements and principles of healing are scattered throughout the "Arcana" and other works. Nevertheless, here is a complete, adequate, and efficacious system for achieving truly constructive results; results that have the approval of both reason and conscience, and on the spiritual as well as on the physical plane. This cannot be said for other cults which make claims for healing. Most so-called spiritual or mental healing cults are characterized by one-sidedness, either leaning to the pseudo-spiritual, or, when material means are employed, to such a contradiction of principles, such inconsistency, that we know it is purely a man-made system, not based on truth proceeding from the Supreme Authority.

Swedenborg's philosophy embodies a great and an harmonious system which is predominantly consistent on the physical material, and on the spiritual planes of being.

In view of the progress other cults have made with their healing work, in spite of inconsistencies, it is astounding that the New Church has not put into practice the great truths of spiritual healing as embodied in Swedenborg's theological philosophy. I well appreciate that here and there in the literature of the New Church are sermons and pamphlets commenting on "Religion and Health," "Religion and Sub-conscious Forces," etc. But it is an outstanding fact that these sermons and pamphlets constitute chiefly

commentaries on the various movements of spiritual and mental healing. There is practically little or no urging or advocacy that the New Church bring into practical application the inexhaustible store of fundamental healing truths contained in Swedenborg's philosophy. I should like to ask here: Is not this an oversight which means a neglected opportunity?

Two of the greatest springs of action of human beings, are, the quest for happiness, and the quest for health, spiritual and physical health. Both are available in Swedenborg's philosophy. Reverend Percy Dearmer, an Episcopal minister, has recently said in this connection, that "The church that ministers only to the spiritual to the neglect of the body, is fulfilling only half its mission."

It is a fact that Swedenborg's therapeutic spiritual teachings are receiving greater consideration from exponents of other cults than they are by New-Church organizations. Certain of the so-called psychologists previously referred to are culling from Swedenborg facts which will give their system of thought a greater claim for possession of knowledge of spiritual things,—and without giving Swedenborg the credit.

The Episcopalians have recently organized a new healing movement known as The Society of the Nazarene. The director of the organization for the United States, the Rev. A. J. Gaynor Banks, quotes Swedenborg, in an introduction to a little book on "Spiritual Radio." Reverend Mr. Banks says, that,

> Swedenborg saw these things [spiritual processes] and developed from them his famous doctrine of Correspondences, and the recent revival of interest in his books and teachings is significant. It is simply a new emphasis upon sacramental philosophy—that every outward and visible achievement of science adumbrates some inward and invisible spiritual reality.

Whatever may be our estimate of this organization, the fact remains that the directors of it are actively and consistently applying their knowledge of spiritual healing. They are getting results of a kind, at least, in the healing of sick-

ness, but, most important of all, they are holding their people to the Episcopalian faith, and thus stemming the tide of departure to other cults. To judge from reports, they are not only holding their own people, but are attracting others to their fold. The New Church can do as well, with an organization actively exploiting Swedenborg's principles of spiritual healing.

The New Church possesses, in Swedenborg's psychology and spiritual healing principles, the most potent agencies for drawing to it that vast number of individuals of progressive thought who stand in need of both physical and spiritual health. I would venture to say that the New Church can do more than all other organizations; for in Swedenborg's writings there is available an inexhaustible store of truths that satisfy both mind and heart, and equalled nowhere else. One unique thing about Swedenborg's psychology is that it forms a logical and progressive starting point for understanding his theological philosophy. There is no abrupt break in the continuity of his ideas; there is a continual advancement which is thoroughly consistent with what has gone before. Rational Psychology, as we learn it from Swedenborg, is therefore an important stepping stone, which, once accepted, will make for new recruits to the ranks of the New Church.

In the foregoing no attempt has been made either to estimate or to expound Swedenborg. I have tried merely to express some measure of my profound admiration for that portion of his philosophy and science which first made a gripping appeal to me, and which finally, by progressive stages, brought to me the realization that the New Christian Religion is one that thoroughly satisfies both the heart and the intellect; that is approved by both reason and conscience —the religion of the New Era.

Swedenborg's search for the soul—a quest which stimulated him to indefatigable labors for nearly half a century —resulted in an achievement greater than his original hopes. This was the discovery of truth, both natural and

spiritual; by which discovery he became the medium through which such truth could be couched in modern language and conveyed to human beings on earth, giving us a creed to live by, here and now, and a foreknowledge of the life to come.

J. David Larson.

DIET FROM THE STANDPOINT OF RELIGION.

By John P. Sutherland, M.D., Sc. D.

THE most potent thing on this earth is Man; and the one thing about Man that raises him incalculably above all other forms of life is his brain, or more correctly the power that uses the brain.

It is the mental power that makes the difference, although the organic brain of Man differs in certain respects from the brains of other animals in its complexities of architecture which adapt it to higher uses. Other animals have cerebrum and cerebellum, each having the properties characteristic of these structures wherever found. All animals possessing specialized sense organs also have in the brain localized centres for the perception of the special sensations: touch, taste, smell, hearing, vision. All animals have special motor centres wherein stimuli productive of definite muscular contractions originate. All normal brains have connecting and coördinating departments, and all these things are similarly placed and inter-related in the brains of all animals. The one organic distinguishing feature of Man's brain is the presence of a developed, relatively large fore-brain, the frontal lobes being relatively and absolutely larger than those found in other animals.

However, it is not so much in the realm of the organic as in that of the functional that the real difference lies, although theoretically the more intricate the function, the greater is the differentiation in organic structure and form. The functions of all brains, human or other animal, include sense perceptions (vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch), memory, the origination of motor impulses, imagination, reasoning, volition, emotions, coördination, reflexes, secretion, ex-

cretion, and nutrition (i.e., control of all the vegetative functions).

Even the untutored human brain, however, is capable of higher and more intricate functions than the highest of the animal brains. Along many lines the difference is of degree rather than of kind, e.g., animals can observe, can appreciate physical environment in a marked degree, and, by a valuation of conditions, apparently drawing conclusions, can adapt their actions to these conclusions or conditions. This is a sort of reasoning possessed by lower animals but restricted very decidedly in scope. The limitations of reasoning, imagination, volition, and emotions, among the animals are easily and quickly reached. While this is true among many members of the *genus homo,* it is also true of the human brain that it is capable of reaching heights and depths of reasoning, imagination, volition and emotions absolutely out of reach of the highest and most developed of the animal brains.

Another point of difference is that throughout aeons of time, so far as can be appreciated, the functions of the sub-human brain have not been increased in any way. Very likely all brains, animal and human, are structurally just what they were 25,000 or 50,000 or more years ago, but functionally while it is claimed that the most capable human brain of today is not more capable of original work than were the noted and best brains of 2000 years ago, the mass brain of today, through education, is greatly advanced beyond the average individual or mass brain of 2000 or 3000 years ago, or even of much less time. In a word, development cannot be predicated of the sub-human brain, whereas it is the one hopeful possibility of the human brain.

Again, the untutored brain of certain races seems to be capable of as high idealism in regard to fidelity, chastity, tribal duties, honesty, and devotion to conceptions of deity as that of so-called "cultured" races.

Probably the distinguishing feature of the human brain, or preferably, perhaps, the mind that utilizes the structural brain, is its power of forming high conceptions concerning

a Creator; concerning life present and future; concerning duty in every and all relations of life; concerning beauty, harmony in all things, fidelity, chastity, morality, honesty, good-will, charity, love, service, right and wrong, etc., one might say concerning religion, because whereas no known animal possesses anything that can by any stretch of imagination or fact be called religion, no known race of peoples is without some (or a) religion, and it is this religion which is the great controlling factor of their lives.

There are many to whom any reference to religion is obnoxious, who dislike to talk about it, possibly because their views are so vague, yet who may acknowledge in a half-hearted way that there must be a Creator, a Deity, a God, Who reigns over the universe, but they don't know much about it, and "It's all right anyhow!"

There are others who think they have no religion; who hold the idea there is no Supreme Intelligence to Whom is due the creation and maintenance of the universe; who prefer to ascribe all things to some so-called Nature, some Force, Power, or Energy that slowly during the lapse of time has been developed and augmented into the controlling influence throughout the universe.

There are still others, and very many of them, who are convinced as definitely as it is possible for a mind to be convinced, that it is impossible for nothing to produce something; that something cannot come from nothing, for "from nothing, nothing can come"; that the presence or existence of any force or substance must be only a result, and since all results are due to causes, there must be some Cause that produces force and substance. A self-existent force doing things blindly, without guidance or directing, is unthinkable to many who are convinced that there is a One and One Only Supreme Source of all force and all substance, the one and only Self-Existent, Self-Creative, the Intelligent Creator of the entire universe, who brought nature into existence with all the powers and orderliness and stability ascribed to her.

It must be accepted as a truism that Man did not make himself; that he is a product, a created thing. And as a piece of machinery, a cleverly made mechanism, does not know its maker, so Man the created will never really know his Creator. He does know something, and may know much more about his Source; but Man the finite will never be able to comprehend the all of the Infinite. Man yet has developed only to the point of learning a few things about the energies and the methods which have produced the so-called "material substances" of this earth and the universe it is a part of. He has still much more to learn than he has learned, and the more humbly and receptively he goes about his lessons the sooner will he attain unto a knowledge that will clear up some of the present mysteries.

The essentials of religion are, first, to acknowledge God, to possess a belief, conviction, or knowledge, that there is an All-Powerful, Omniscient, Omnipresent Intelligence, from Whom proceeded all things that are, and by Whom the stars and all things are maintained in their courses; and, secondly, to "do good," or to live a life as consistent as possible with the conception one is able to form of the Source of all Life, the Infinite Love and Wisdom,—to avoid to the utmost of one's ability all forms of evil in thought or action as an offense against Him. Transgressions and disobedience of any known or recognized "natural laws" are evils which entail their own results. In other words, it is the application of one's conceptions of the Creator, the Infinite God, to the affairs and relationships of every day life, that forms the practical end of religion.

To avoid misconception it may be stated that the term Nature as here used and understood, refers not to any unguided force or power, or energy or influence, but to the forces and substances which are the ultimate manifestation on this material plane of Life, of Creative and Intelligent Love and Wisdom. All things of Nature are looked upon as revelations of the purposes and powers of the Infinite. Not that these manifestations and revelations are under-

stood and comprehended by man to any great degree as yet; but any degree of comprehension makes by just so much for happiness and health and usefulness.

To some it may seem irreligious to try to connect, or see any relationship between, diet and religion, but perhaps the distance between may not be so far a cry after all.

Man is a created thing; he does not create himself. Man is a form of life. Life is a form of energy, a force, a something immaterial in the ordinary sense, intangible, impalpable: a something capable of inhabiting matter. We are taught by biologists that "Life is the sum of the properties possible to protoplasm"; that "protoplasm is the *vehicle* of life." In the words of St. Paul, "There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body." Practically, it is the consensus of opinion that man's material or natural body is a temporary affair intended to be for a while the home of the indwelling life or "spiritual body." It is unnecessary to consider here the modern ideas concerning force and matter, that they are simply different manifestations of motions or vibrations of electrons or anything else. The mind still recognizes the wide distance between dead, inactive substance called "matter" and the vivifying, activating and active influence called "life." Everyone knows it is not the dead material substance of the body that can acknowledge any obligations or indebtedness to the neighbor or to a Higher Being; it is the unseen, immaterial and invisible vivifying essence that forms the mind, that recognizes obligations and that can deliberately and with intelligence choose to do this or that, to determine whether the action shall be thus or so! Animals cannot deliberately choose between two paths or lines of conduct; their actions are governed by "instinct," the inherited reflexes of thousands of generations. They even eat by "instinct," taking those things which through a long series of generations have been found most suitable. Man has to choose, to decide, to select, because he alone of all forms of life possesses freedom of will. The almost unerring instinct that guides

animals he does not possess. His actions are to be the result of judgment and his judgment is dependent upon knowledge. And it is here that right and wrong come into close quarters. A person who does not know cannot be held morally responsible. He may be, and is, legally liable and responsible. He may not know "the gun was loaded" but he is responsible for not knowing. He may not know the mushrooms he eats are poisonous, but he suffers the consequences though not transgressing any Divine law. *If he knows, on the other hand, that certain things are injurious, and as a matter of deliberate choice takes them or gives to another, he is doing an injury to himself or another, and by just so much transgresses.* "If ye were blind, ye should have no sin." (John 9:41.)

If there be any connection at all between diet and religion, one might ask why the matter is not more definitely referred to in the Decalogue or in the Scriptures, or in the personal teachings of the Lord. That the subject of food for the body is not wholly ignored in the Scriptures, the following quotations and references may prove.

And God said, Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat.

And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat. (Gen. 1:29, 30.)

And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food. (Gen. 2:9.)

Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. (Gen. 3:18.)

And when ye shall come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food. . . . (Lev. 19:23.)

He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man: that he may bring forth food out of the earth. (Ps. 104:14.)

And by the river upon the bank thereof, on this side and on that side, shall grow all trees for meat, whose leaf shall not fade, neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed: it shall bring forth new fruit according to his months . . .: and the fruit thereof

shall be for meat, and the leaf thereof for medicine. (Ezek. 47:12.)

The leaves thereof were fair, and the fruit thereof much, and in it was meat for all. (Dan. 4:12.)

Surely I will no more give thy corn to be meat for thine enemies. (Isa. 62:8.)

Reference to the whole of the first chapter of Daniel is permissible, for here we have the story of Daniel and his three companions who, refusing the meats and wine provided by the king, lived on a diet of pulse (vegetable food) and became fairer of countenance, fatter in flesh, and possessed of more "knowledge and skill in all learning and wisdom" than their competitors for royal favor who lived at the king's table.

These and many other quotations which might be made would seem at first sight strongly in favor of a diet composed of the fruits of the earth. But as early in Genesis as the fourth chapter, fourth verse, we read that "Abel . . . brought of the firstlings of his flock," suggesting, though not definitely stating, that animals were used for food. Later, however,—viz., Gen. 9:3, 4,—it is definitely stated that "Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you: even as the green herb have I given you all things. But the flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat."

Still further instruction concerning food is given in Leviticus, 11th chapter, where, in addition to the directions given in verses 2 and 3,—"These are the beasts which ye shall eat among all the beasts that are on the earth. Whatsoever parteth the hoof, and is clovenfooted, and cheweth the cud, among the beasts, that shall ye eat,"—may be found a detailed list of clean and unclean animal food.

These permissions, injunctions, and directions, very evidently however, are insufficient as to detail; for in several places in Leviticus, Deuteronomy, and elsewhere, we read:

And whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among you, that eateth any manner of blood; I will even set my face against that soul that eateth blood, and will cut him off from among his people. For the life of the

flesh is in the blood: and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul. Therefore I said unto the children of Israel, no soul of you shall eat blood, neither shall any stranger that sojourneth among you eat blood. And whatsoever man there be of the children of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among you, which hunteth or catcheth any beast or fowl that may be eaten; he shall even pour out the blood thereof, and cover it with dust. For it is the life of all flesh; the blood of it is for the life thereof: therefore I said unto the children of Israel, Ye shall eat the blood of no manner of flesh: for the life of all flesh is the blood thereof: whosoever eateth it shall be cut off. (Lev. 17:10-14.)

Ye shall not eat anything with the blood. (Lev. 19:26.)

Only thou shalt not eat the blood thereof; thou shalt pour it upon the ground as water. (Deut. 15:23.)

Many other references might be made to show that the subject of diet is not overlooked in the Bible. Flesh is referred to no fewer than 399 times; bread 370; meat 256; fruit 216; wine 213; oil 190; corn 87; the vine 78; figs 57; honey 55; wheat 52; food 49; milk 46; herbs 35; grapes 33; flour 19,—and the list might be extended.

Even those not acquainted with the facts of a revelation of the internal or spiritual sense of the Word are aware of the fact that the Book of Books was intended to give instruction in things far more important than the mere nourishment of the body.

The wonderful hygiene and sanitation of Leviticus, the history, allegory, symbolism, and parable of the entire Word, all find a high climax in those unparalleled chapters in the Gospel of St. John, wherein our thoughts are lifted far above the physical.

Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again: But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life. (John 4:13, 14.)

Labor not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life. (*Ibid.*, 6:27.)

I am that bread of life. Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die. I am the

living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. (*Ibid.*, 6:48-51.)

The same teaching was given mankind many years before the preceding was written; for we read

Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live. (Deut. 8:3.)

We are nowhere taught, however, that the body is of no consequence and may be neglected for higher things. For instance, St. Paul writes:

Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any man defile the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are. (I Cor. 3:16, 17.)

And what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? For ye are the temple of the living God. (II Cor. 6:16.)

If, then, Man does not find in the Decalogue or in the Scriptures the guiding help he needs and wants, where in his helpless ignorance is he to obtain the knowledge that is so necessary to his physical well-being? Is there any other revelation that will bring Man into closer relationship with the great Directing Power of the universe? There are many of us who claim there is great help to be had and to be found in the revelation called Nature: who cannot agree with John Burroughs when he said "Nature builds and plants blindly, haphazardly, all around the circle; her handmaidens are industrious but undirected"—and more to the same purpose. We prefer to agree with the physicist, the modern scientist who claims that everything in Nature is under the direction of definite Law: who is earnestly and courageously seeking to discover Nature's laws; who has already profitably discovered many such laws in all fields of research; in chemistry, physics, biology, heredity, etc. And there are many of us who, while agreeing with these latter scientists, like to think of Nature as the revelation of Creative Love and Wisdom on the lowest degree or

material basis of life: or in the exquisitely beautiful and expressive phrase of Edwin Markham, in a lecture recently delivered in Boston (Nov. 15, 1925), as "the time-vesture of the Eternal."

In this connection it is well to recall the words of the psalmist who wrote:

> The heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's: but the earth hath he given to the children of men. (Ps. 115:16.)

It is for Man, then, to make use of this gift, this manifestation of Divine Power, and continue to investigate, observe, analyze, and study the "earth," or Nature and its laws, as therein is to be found the revelations and guidance needed to solve many of the problems of physical life; for we read concerning the newly formed man:

> Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth. (Gen. 1:26.)
>
> Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou has put all things under his feet. (Ps. 8:6.)

With these gifts, Man had bestowed on him rationality and freedom of will, so that through knowledge he might choose between good and evil; between acting in concert with Nature's decrees or in defiance of them. Transgressions of Nature's laws will just as surely meet with disaster and physical ills, as failure to live in compliance with the Decalogue and the two great commandments will be followed by spiritual disaster. It is not necessary to be acquainted with all of Nature's laws before we can acquire a sound habitation for the spirit, a temple suitable for its inmate; for "the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple" (Ps. 19:7).

Let it be emphasized that all things in the universe, all natural phenomena, are brought about in an orderly way through action in accordance with law; that Nature has decreed many things, and that her laws are God's laws, and are inexorable.

The whole history of life, both human and subhuman, teaches us that nature will not condone disobedience; . . . no living being stands above her law, and protozoon or demigod, if they transgress, alike must die. (Dr. Lothrop Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Color, p. 304.)

It would seem probable that the writer of the 119th Psalm was thinking of more than the Decalogue or the hygienic and sanitary directions of Leviticus and Deuteronomy, in using, as he did, the words "testimonies" 23 times; "precepts" 21 times; "law" 25 times; "statutes" 22 times; "commandments" 22 times; "judgment" or "judgments" 22 times. May he not have been thinking of the many and various manifestations of Creative Wisdom and Love in the realms of Nature?

A broad interpretation of religion then will, or may, include as guides to life acquaintance with and obedience to the testimonies, and precepts, laws and decrees of Nature as they are revealed by industrious observation, research, and experience. The astronomer acknowledges the existence of law in the development, activities, and structure of the stars. Laws are recognized in physics, in chemistry, in biology, in embryology, and in physiology there are recognized laws of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. Natural laws are found connected with all the natural sciences. The operation of these laws is shown in results; and it is to be realized that these laws existed and were in operation long before Man came upon the face of the earth, and was given "dominion over all the earth."

Man has but recently discovered vitamins in food, as yet unrecognizable elements, which have been in foods since the dawn of creation; certainly since ages before the present era.

Even in things spiritual there is law, as shown by the following instances:

Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: For everyone that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. (Matt. 7:7-8.)

Behold, I stand at the door and knock: if any man hear my voice and open the door. . . . (Rev. 3:20.)

The law here suggested evidently is that man *must* coöperate, he *must* do something: ask, seek, knock, and open. Otherwise no receiving, no finding, no communion. On account of the inestimable gift of freedom of will bestowed upon Man, the Lord has, in a sense, limited his own power to act, and has made a law which he recognizes.

It may be taken for granted that there are laws governing the subjects of diet and nutrition. All living things, that is, all forms of life, vegetable as well as animal, must have as food those substances of which their own structures are composed. No plant or animal, including Man, can create the elements which constitute their bodies. These elements must be supplied by mother earth, including air, water, and sunshine, in the case of plant life; and by the vegetable and animal kingdoms, in the case of animals. Instinctively, all forms of animal life (except Man) take as food those substances, few in number, which will supply the chemical elements needed to develop their bodies and maintain them in a healthy condition. Man's body is a body of flesh and blood so like the bodies of other mammalia that the specially trained eye is needed to detect any of the microscopical differences; that is, the minute structure of all mammalian bodies is practically the same, and the same laws govern the nutrition of all mammalia.

Once more, on account of Man's freedom of will he must choose; he must select from the great variety offered by Nature those foods which will furnish the needed chemical elements to construct and maintain a healthy body. Man having no instinct to rely on must possess knowledge obtained by observation, experience, and reasoning. He must be rational as it was intended he should be. By experience, Man has learned that some things furnished by Nature are not nourishing, in short that they are injurious. The fact that he cannot make any one of these things, even the least of them, has not yet sunken into his consciousness.

He knows he cannot make a grain of wheat or corn, or any vegetable or fruit, but he does not yet know enough to realize that the food for his body has been made for him, just as surely as the food for his soul has been prepared for and offered to him.

Nature has decreed that sundry things shall grow and furnish mankind all necessary food. Does mankind respect these decrees, or does he violate them? Let us briefly review a few of man's dietetic transgressions.

Grains.—Nature makes for man's use several grains, of which wheat and rice may be taken as examples. Man has never been able, and to the end of time never will be able, to make a grain of wheat or a kernel of rice. He may prepare the ground, plant the seed, and cultivate the crop; but God alone giveth the increase. Man harvests the crop and then very deliberately, and as it were with malice aforethought, ingeniously divorces what nature has put together; that is, he converts wheat which contains a variety of most useful and nutritious materials into a white and attractive flour which by itself is wholly incapable of supporting life. It is unnecessary here to enumerate the many uses of white flour; enough to say no form of life, except possibly the yeast plant and allied organisms, can be supported by it. The wheat has been spoiled by man's intervention, as can so easily be proven by feeding animals (birds preferably) on white flour products, and other "control" animals on the unmilled, unspoiled grain. A few experiments will convince one of the positively injurious properties of all white flour products.

It is now universally acknowledged that the eating of white or polished rice as freely as it is eaten in the Orient is capable in a very large number of individuals of inducing a fatal disease called beri-beri. The removal, by washing or by polishing, of a thin, delicately brownish outer covering with which Nature has enveloped each rice kernel is sufficient to transform a food that can adequately support life, into what is positively injurious to the point of death

dealing. Demineralizing and devitaminizing the rice, as in the case of the wheat which is converted into white flour, is a flagrant transgression of a law of Nature that surely and inevitably brings suffering as a result.

Sugar.—Another equally perverse and injurious interference with Nature's plans is in the manufacture and refining of sugar, whereby a limpid juice containing a very small percentage of sugar is, by evaporation, converted into a concentrated, practically a one hundred per cent sweet, which is rendered still more unnatural and harmful by the refining process, which among other things demineralizes it. This artificial product is another of Man's presumptions which exacts a heavy penalty.

The physiologist well knows that man's physical well-being demands sugar as food, but, as in the case of vitamines, Nature knew it ages before physiology or biology formed any part of man's knowledge, and Nature amply and prodigally supplied sugar in wholesome and necessary combination in berries and fruits of all sorts, in melons, in sweet potatoes, corn, beets, peas, parsnips, and other vegetables—a generous supply to meet a recognized necessity. Man does not know how much sugar is needed daily to maintain his body temperature and energy but Nature knows and has made the wise provision. Not appreciating the fact that Nature knows anything about the nutrition of Man's body that she brought into existence, "Civilized" mankind transgresses appallingly by ingeniously making jellies, jams, and preserves from fruits by the addition of large quantities of granulated sugar to fruit juices, and by manufacturing confectionery, ice cream, and too many so-called delicacies to be here named. No wonder that disease stalks relentlessly through the land, taking a heavy toll of suffering.

Vegetables.—Vegetables too commonly are unintelligently prepared for man's consumption by being boiled in a large quantity of water, so as to lose much of their soluble mineral content as well as their flavorings. Potatoes which

form so large a portion of the ordinary menu, are usually made into a very deficient food by having not only the thin skin but an underlying layer of mineral salts and vitamins removed by paring: in this respect making the potato analagous to the disease-inducing polished rice.

Meats.—Another dietetic evil and a wholly useless custom is the eating of meats of any sort. A slight acquaintance with physiology and a few simple analyses will convince one that meats contain the waste chemical products of life: waste matters which result from various bodily activities and which being gathered into the blood stream are carried to the kidneys for elimination as urine. Some of these wastes are decidedly toxic and can be of no possible use to the consumer. Possibly it is the presence of these wastes in the blood that gave rise to the repeated injunction found in Leviticus and Deuteronomy not to eat the blood of animals, for whosoever so doeth shall be cut off. Possibly again, the familiar command "Thou shalt not kill" was not intended to apply solely to the killing of Man by Man. Has Man any right wantonly to take the life of any animal, or to destroy life that is not his, for the sake of getting a food that is not needed by him and that is injurious to him?

Milk.—Perhaps a more flagrant transgression is in Man's unthinking following of the age-long habit of using subhuman milk as food. A detailed discussion of this topic is not possible at this time, but the language of Nature is peculiarly explicit concerning milk. The receptive mind is told that milk is intended to be the one and perfect food for all mammalia, each species after its kind, and only during the early period of life. In due season, a few weeks or a few months at most, the supply of milk is shut off and after that no more milk is furnished the offspring. This obviously is a law of Nature; a decree of the Creator. Nature exquisitely adapts her means to ends and each species has its own particular kind of milk. The cow's milk is exactly the food for the bovine calf, not for Man: and there

are many potential differences between the calf and Man. Under the pressure of domestication the cow has been made to yield a larger quantity of milk for a longer period of time than she ever would if living under natural conditions. Nature has also decreed that milk shall pass from the mater to her offspring without exposure to air: that is, without running the risk of being infected by germs. The ordinary process of milking exposes the milk to certain infection, and such milk is so germ-laden that it is preserved with difficulty, and may become a dangerous food for human beings.

These are only a few of the many instances which might be presented to show that man is not willing to trust his Maker in the matter of diet. He evidently distrusts his Maker and from perversity will not follow the suggestions, the testimonies, the decrees, the revelations, or the laws of Nature, but prefers to be guided by his own conceits, his impulses, his unreasoning desires. No wonder that Man, the only potentially rational creature on the earth, should be the sickliest. The illnesses which result from the dietetic errors here referred to may and do vary from mild disorders to serious and even fatal diseases; but whatever the degree of mildness or severity, they are a disgrace to humanity and are entirely unnecessary.

No creature on the face of the earth defies Nature as definitely as Man does; and in this matter of diet he is almost inconceivably thoughtless, indifferent, and ignorant.

On account of Man's ignorance and perversity one is justified in saying, with all reverence, "If the Lord does not know how to feed me, certainly man does not." No wonder the psalmist prayed "Keep back thy servant also from presumptuous sins; let them not have dominion over me (Ps. 19:13).

With a clearer understanding and comprehension of Nature's plans, and a loyal coöperation therewith, Man unquestionably could greatly widen the distance which now separates him from the rest of the mammalian kingdom

called the "beasts of the field." By freeing himself from the bonds of enslaving appetites; by restraining natural impulses and acquiring fuller self-control; by realizing the vastness of his ignorance and appreciating his own incompetency, Man may find himself in a condition to humbly, gratefully, and confidently accept the bountiful provisions for his physical well-being supplied by a truly wise and beneficent Nature. To do this is to truly acknowledge the omnipotence and omniscience of God the Creator of all things; and this is the fundamental and essence of Religion.

Thy hands have made me and fashioned me: give me understanding, that I may learn thy commandments. (Ps. 119:73.)

JOHN P. SUTHERLAND.

POLITICAL FREEDOM IN FRANCE AND ITS RELATION TO THE GOTHIC STYLE.

By William Cummings Richardson.

HISTORIANS claim with emphasis that the French derive their temperament and their blood mainly from the Celts of ancient Gaul. It is evident that the Celtic is their persistent strain, though this strain has been modified by Roman and Frankish intermarriage. A similar modification obtained in Britain, also originally Celtic, except as to Ireland, which for thousands of years, has by persistent inbreeding so accentuated racial tendencies that they exhibit practically the same characteristics. The Celts adopted the language of the Romans which they developed into the French tongue. On the other hand the Franks failed to Germanize Gaul in any marked degree. They themselves became Romanized instead.

In 768 when Charlemagne came into power, Feudalism had already made some progress. While he tried to supplant it by establishing a single central power, he, at the same time, through awards of land to his retainers, inadvertently laid the foundation for its revival, which occurred at his death.

Feudalism is of course based on the land. Its maxim was "No land without a Lord, no Lord without land." As one writer puts it, it was a mighty social pyramid. At the top stood the king, next the great lords, who were practically as much kings as their chief, though of course, the prestige of his name counted for something. Then came the small land-owners, then the serfs. The absolute slaves need not be counted, since they had practically no legal rights. It meant that every man from the serf up, owed service to some one above him; every man from the king

down owed protection to some one beneath him. The system extended to all men, to all institutions, even the church held its possessions under feudal conditions, and had to "fight or pray" for every acre it owned.

Feudalism was attended with terrible abuses and revolting tyranny but it was preferable to barbarism. The great power that centered in the hands of the feudal lords at this time is evident, for when they had wiped out the last vestige of Carolingian influence, they chose one of their own number, Hugh Capet, the Count of Paris, to be the king of France, from whom has descended every sovereign that has ruled the land since 987 (excepting of course the Napoleons).

Hugh Capet himself, was only the nominal head of a few great lords who considered themselves his equal. His domain was then very small, the whole of it, less than one twentieth of the France of today. The new king had no national army and no national revenue. Outside the dukedom of France where he reigned, he was quite powerless, unless the neighbouring barons chose to help him. He was fortunate in that Burgundy and Normandy were ruled by his own relatives, who were favorable to him. South of the Loire he had no support whatever. Yet out of this slender beginning, modern France was at length to arise. Of his short reign, only nine years, there is little to say except that by constant struggle he was able to establish the French feudal monarchy on the hereditary basis on which it was to rest for nearly eight hundred years, till the great revolution came and swept it away forever.

During this, the mediæval period of French history, a feeling of insecurity everywhere prevailed. There was perpetual warfare between the barons. Every man of them was either fighting to get possession of some other lord's estate, or he was fighting to retain possession of his own. In addition to the unrest and anxiety due to the suffering that sprang from the frequent outbreak of famine and pestilence (the result of ravaged fields, interrupted labor,

and unsanitary conditions of life), there was mental gloom which nothing could lighten.

For many generations it had been preached and prophesied that the world was coming to an end at the dawn of the year 1000. The church directly or indirectly encouraged this belief. Moved by that impulse, the rich and powerful made large gifts to the church, went on pilgrimages to distant shrines, or entered monasteries to make atonement for their sins. As the time approached men not only ceased to erect buildings, but allowed those that were standing, to fall into disrepair, and everywhere inactivity was the rule as the world awaited its day of doom.

The dark ages have not been misnamed. While feudalism was a step upward from barbarism, it differed from it save in degree. It meant permanent civil war, the oppression by the greater seigneur of the lesser seigneur, up to revolt against the sovereign himself. At this time even the monasteries were little better. Pillaged and burned by the Norman invaders, ransomed in turn by the seigneurs, and so controlled by lay abbots, they had become for the most part deserted.

One saw installed within their precincts, the lay abbots with their wives and children, with their men at arms, and their packs of hunting dogs. Bishops and abbots were equipped as grand seigneurs and maintained their feudal courts, and everywhere spiritual decadence made clear that drastic reform alone could save these institutions from utter extinction.

This necessity was nowhere better understood than in the church itself, and with this purpose in view, early in the tenth century, in 909 to be exact, an abbey was founded at Cluny in Eastern France. It had the backing of William the duke of Aquitaine and Pope John, the IXth. It became the means of bringing about a great reform in monastic life. It grew to enormous size. Its church was larger than St. Peter's at Rome. It became the mother abbey of similar establishments from the Pyranees to Poland, and

at one time it had three hundred and forty establishments and churches under its jurisdiction. It was the great educational force of the time, and gathered within its communities the men whose tastes were for the arts of peace.

At Cluny in the department of practical arts alone, men were trained to be joiners, carpenters, masons, cement-makers, bakers, brewers, fruit-growers, curriers, laundry-men, weavers, shoe-makers, furriers, lock-smiths, silver-smiths, black-smiths, as well as copyists, painters, sculptors, and architects. From her cloisters says Viollet-le-Duc, proceeded reformers, teachers, savants, physicians, bishops, popes and sovereigns.

The monastic brotherhoods had first appeared in the East, in the fourth century, and by the sixth century had become active agents of the church, in practical affairs, meeting the people on their own ground. They grew in wealth and numbers till in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, there were no less than eleven hundred such establishments founded, controlling a vast amount of property and exerting a far reaching influence.

It is at this time and within the monasteries, that we find the first indication of a birth of civic consciousness in Northern Europe. In the long struggle with the feudal lords in which all were involved, the religious orders and the bishops (with the sovereign pontiff at their head) had held firmly to the point, that they would not admit the vassalage of the church. In the end the ecclesiastics won out in their struggle for spiritual predominance and though opposed with tremendous pressure, carried their point completely.

This triumph of their monastic school-masters over the seigneurs was not lost upon their lay pupils and when they had become influential elements in civic life, now educated and well-to-do, they determined to secure like freedom from oppression for the towns where they resided. The first symptom of their revolt was shown in their demand

for the Commune, or free town government, which would insure to them:

1st. The right to pay only a fixed tax to the king, in place of the obligation to pay over to the agents of their feudal lords whatever they might demand.

2nd. The right to elect their own magistrates.

3rd. The right to enact their own local laws.

These two movements, the first in the church, the second of the laity, were quite independent of one another. In fact their clerical teachers labelled the early efforts of the laity "execrable"; for it not infrequently happened that the over-lord was an ecclesiastic himself; sometimes he was a secular baron. In the case of Laon, he was a bishop, who was more warrior than churchman. In that instance the townspeople first bought their freedom, and when the Bishop had used the money, he went back on his bargain, and the people revolted and killed him and burned the cathedral. During the eleventh, twelfth, and a part of the thirteenth centuries, the process of enfranchisement was going on with varying success in different parts of France and the low countries. One of the outstanding privileges that went with the Commune was the right to build a municipal bell tower, whose tocsin was the signal for the people to get together for peaceful assembly or for war. They became very strong through their trade guilds; unions, with ideals so high, that our labor unions in comparison with the guilds are simply gangs of dishonest profiteers.

As the twelfth century came on, the great secular task of the religious brotherhoods had been practically fulfilled. During the dark ages they had safeguarded learning and the arts, and had educated the laity to meet the work of reconstruction, that began with the dawning of the eleventh century. New forces now came to the front, and their prestige began to decline. The enfranchisement of the people furnished opportunity for both the king and the episcopacy to play a new part in the activities of the time. It became for the interest of the king to favor the towns, and

to grant them the confirmation of their charters; for if the towns looked to him for the protection of their rights, they would lend him money and be ready to furnish him troops in case of emergency. It became also for the interests of the bishops to show sympathy with the aspirations of the people in order to win back to themselves the allegiance so long given to the monasteries. At the same time the bishops, cut loose from the seigneurs, and discarded their own feudal pretensions.

It is obvious that after the new form of civic government was inaugurated a hall for public meetings in all the larger towns became an imperative necessity. The most spacious edifice at the time was the fine old Romanesque cathedral to be found in every considerable town in France. The buildings had been inspired by Byzantine tradition and built by monastic architects. They had held their own during centuries of storm and stress but were inadequate to meet the new demands. It became evident that they must be replaced by much larger edifices. It appears that the monastic architects had tried many times and had suffered many disasters in their efforts to produce churches with wide naves. After many failures they had arrived finally at the limit of safety for the cylindrical vault; to exceed that limit, with the means at their disposal, meant only further disaster. Now to secure an increased seating capacity was only another way of saying that a method must be devised to increase the width of the nave. A prompt solution of this problem had become of such extreme importance that the lay architects in every town addressed themselves to the problem. Their animation of mind and the value of their previous training was soon shown by the invention of the *pointed vault, the control of its thrust, the new and efficient method of lighting,* and the proper distribution of exits to facilitate the safe handling of large crowds. Notre Dame at Paris, seating seventy-five hundred people, was one of the earliest cathedrals created, and is a wonderful piece of practical planning. At this juncture, substantial

encouragement by the bishops took a form that assured a great measure of success to these enterprises. The hierarchy was as wise then as now. They said: "We will help you to build great assembly halls, large enough not only to house the Communes, but at the same time to serve as great cathedrals for the religious ceremonies of the Church."

The tremendous magnitude of this work is well suggested by Henry Adams who says that within a single century, the French built churches which, according to an estimate made in 1840, would have cost more than five billions of francs to replace,—a sum well nigh unheard of when Adams wrote. Kings, princes, grand-nobility, petty nobility, wealthy burghers, craftsmen, tradespeople, peasants, apprentices, serfs joined in a great outpouring of gifts for the building of churches.

Viollet-le-Duc likens the enthusiasm, that this union of king, the episcopacy and the people produced, and that pervaded the entire realm, to that which produced the pyramids, which erected the temples of Greece, which covered the Roman Empire with splendid public buildings, and which in modern times has tied Europe together with railroad lines. He is careful to affirm that he does not mean to say that religious zeal was anywhere lacking, but that combined with this religious zeal, there was a tremendous civic enthusiasm, which was manifest in the extraordinary activities that immediately followed. Between 1180 and 1240, a period of sixty years only, the great cathedrals were begun and pushed forward with amazing rapidity; for not only was the wealth of all classes devoted to the work, but their personal physical labor as well.

So great had been this activity that at the death of Philip Augustus, in 1223, the principal Cathedrals were Paris, Chartres, Bourges, Noyon, Soissons, Meux, Amiens, Arras, Courtrai, Rouen, Evereux, Seez, Bayeux, Contances, Mans, Augers, Poictiers and Tours. Certain dioceses, united politically with the royal domain, as vassals of the

crown, pushed their cathedrals at the same time, at Rheims, Sens, Troyes, in Champagne, Auxerre and Nevers in Bourgogne.

Now in Roman construction great wealth and multitudes of slaves made it possible to use the cylindrical vault and the round arch, and thereby to roof in very large spaces.

In the Byzantine style the round arch and the cylindrical vault were used for a similar reason, but after the fall of the Roman Empire, these elements were employed in the churches built along the trade routes to and through Europe, as at Ravenna, Venice, and the northern Italian cities, in the south of France and up the right bank of the Rhone into Germany and on the left bank of the Rhone to Toulouse, Perigueux, Augouleme, Poictiers, Normandy, Brittany, and Britain. The buildings were similar all over western Europe, and their style is called the Romanesque; but they were based on Roman tradition only, for Roman wealth and Roman slaves did not belong to mediæval times. All erected by rule of thumb, their stability could only be estimated by the results of previous experiment, and as said above, the limit to the width of the nave had only been determined after numerous and serious disasters. It is well to remember right here that modern scientific construction has only been existent for about a hundred years. Before that time there was no method known by which stability could be absolutely assured. Tradition, experience, and rule of thumb were all that the architect had to fall back upon. So it is indeed remarkable that those great monuments of balanced forces, the great Gothic churches, are standing today. The pointed vault referred to above, a great invention, the product of French genius, is the dominant feature in the French Gothic style. To make a wider nave there were but two possible methods: first, by some kind of vault that would produce the minimum thrust; and second, by the use of visible iron ties. In Italy they have always used the iron ties; but the French would not condescend to such a cowardly method of construction.

They found that the kind of thrust that would send a cylindrical vault to the ground carrying everything with it, could be counterbalanced by properly designed buttresses, if a pointed vault were employed instead. By concentrating the push on these buttresses very little weight would come on the walls between, and so these wall spaces could be filled with stained glass, ornamenting and lighting the interior of the edifice at the same time. It followed as a matter of course that the mouldings, the sculpture, and all the detail had to follow the lines and treatment established by the pointed vaulting and the pointed arches.

It sounds easy, but it was not. As suggested above, only the French genius, trained through several generations of building, could or did produce anything like it. The Gothic style is truly one of the most interesting products of the human mind; but even this style, gradually becoming debased and emasculated, in the fifteenth century, after the wars of Francis I in Italy, was laid aside, and the period of the Renaissance began. We are living in the Renaissance. We do not live in the Gothic period. There have been attempts to revive the Gothic style, but only in church architecture has it been in any degree successful. By men profoundly steeped in the archeology of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries there have been some very good churches erected in recent years. The best one I have seen is that of St. Thomas, on Fifth Avenue, New York. The next best to my mind is the new cathedral now building in Liverpool, England; and we anticipate much in the new Cathedral in Washington, and in St. John the Divine in New York.

At the end of the thirteenth century the great popular movement slowed down, owing to wars with England and the unhappy political conditions of the fourteenth century. In so far as the cathedrals were completed at all, it was due to the personal effort of the bishops and the chapters from that time on. In 1258, St. Louis, in order to check the lawless barons, established a court of justice at Paris,

which was called the Parliament of Paris. He forbade private war and trial by battle. He was by nature a reformer and a lover of justice. To him was due the erection of the Sainte Chapelle.

The crusades that came in his reign checked the advance of the Saracens, hastened the freedom of the cities, the emancipation of the serfs, and a large increase to the power of the court. St. Louis was the only sovereign in the long line of French kings, that ever received the title of Saint; and he deserved it.

His son Philip the Fair came to the throne in 1285. Though in name and in person fair; in character he was just the opposite. In order to provide revenue for the crown he sold titles of nobility to men of low degree, he robbed the Jews, the bankers of the realm, and finally decided to levy a tax on the clergy, which of course immediately involved him in a struggle with the pope. In 1302 he for the first time in the history of France summoned the States-General to meet in Notre Dame. His action shows that a strong middle class had now arisen which had become so prosperous and influential that even the king found it expedient to ask their advice and coöperation. Curiously the clergy, though most unwillingly, felt obliged to join with the nobles and the third estate in backing the king against the pretensions of the pope. The dread of the kings of France of the growing power of the people, however, was so great that from Philip onward for five hundred years the States-General were called together only thirteen times. In this instance backed by the assembly, Philip won out against the pope and indirectly brought about the death of his enemy, and he shrewdly took care that a new pope should be chosen that was satisfactory to him. France at that time definitely took the position that the pope should devote himself to the spiritual functions of the Church, and no longer claim the right to the political control of the nation. In the assembly of 1302, the country people and the peasantry were not repre-

sented; that privilege was not given them till 1484, when they were allowed to choose their own deputies. Henceforth they were to be known as the Third Estate, a name which three hundred years later occupied the most conspicuous place in the history of the Revolution. From the time of this sovereign France was destined to have a checkered career.

The hundred years' war with England beginning in 1346 was so productive of disaster, that the country, under Charles VII, the Dauphin, seemed about to fall completely under the control of her enemy. Driven south of the Loire, he took refuge in Bourges where he held his court. It is easy to imagine the sufferings of the common people during these troublous times. At length when hope was nearly gone and in the darkest hour for France, a simple peasant girl, Joan of Arc, came forward declaring that God had commissioned her to save her despairing country, and conduct Charles to Rheims for his coronation. Under her lead, as you will recall, the English were driven out of France except for a slender foot-hold they were able to retain on French territory, at Calais.

Louis XIth, the son of Charles VIIth, proved to be a much stronger man than his father. He was a diplomat as well as a warrior, and he set about to consolidate the kingdom. This he accomplished by reducing the power of the great nobles and forcing them to yield up their lands to the crown; so that, when Francis 1st came to the throne in 1515, he had for a kingdom the country extending from the Mediterranean and the Pyranees to the English Channel and the low countries. Under his rule the laws were mostly recorded in the French language, and the great body of the inhabitants were represented in the National Assembly. The discordant baronies having now coalesced into the kingdom; the kingdom was well on the way to become a great commonwealth.

It will be noticed that power had gradually been concentrated in the hands of the king, and the check on his

power by the States-General had become practically inoperative. He strengthened his position still further by choosing a select body of men called the Notables, with whom to consult on matters of national interest. This resulted finally in the extinction of what political liberty the people had been able to secure. Through the reigns that followed that of Francis the First, the people came at length to exist only to be exploited by the State, and to be taxed and taxed till they had nothing left for the tax-gatherer. Especially in the reigns of Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI were their sufferings intensified. The wars of these three rulers piled up a debt of 1,300,000,000 dollars, all of which fell on the middle and lower classes. The nobility and higher clergy were exempt. The extravagance and wastefulness of royalty and the nobles, the occurrence of the American Revolution, the writings of the new apostles of radicalism in politics and religion, Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire added to the popular unrest, until under Louis XVI, the crises became so acute that he was forced to convene the States-General. They had not been called together for two hundred years, were ripe for activity dangerous to the monarchy, and took an attitude by no means reassuring to the king.

The Third Estate of the States-General now outnumbering the nobility and the clergy, promptly changed its designation to "The National Assembly," a name that implied that in future no class divisions would be recognized in that body.

One hundred and fifty years before, Louis XIV had declared "I am the State." After the long silence of the States-General, its successor, the National Assembly, now proclaimed "We are the State." The assembly next framed a written constitution, and once more changed its name to the "Constituent Assembly." You will recall that from that step, things moved rapidly. Noblemen, like Lafayette, who sympathized with the people, and worked actively for reform, were swept aside, and the worse elements gained

control. In the end, a bloodthirsty mob reigned supreme throughout the country.

Then France tried pure democracy and succeeded no better than has Russia. Under the Republican form of government, she has steadily acquired strength, and in the late terrible war she lived up to her best traditions of courage and resourcefulness. Continued peace will bring about her ultimate recovery. Her disasters have come from the misgovernment of kings who were obsessed with a distorted love of rule. Under absolutism France has suffered as have all peoples under a like dispensation. Absolute control, without check or hindrance, whether by absolute monarch, or by the democratic mob, has up to date produced nothing but gross injustice and desperate misery.

To New-Church people it should be of interest to recall that Swedenborg was born in 1688, only three years after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, by Louis XIV, had driven the Huguenots out of France. Europe was in a turmoil and a new war had broken out; England, Holland, Austria and Spain had joined in alliance against France. Truly the evils produced by the love of rule, were everywhere apparent in Europe when he appeared on the scene; and when, not many years later, Swedenborg travelled on the continent, he must have sensed the negative conditions that had resulted from these evils.

It is interesting to think over the changes that occurred in his lifetime, and to contrast his serenity of mind, man of affairs that he was, with the unrest that prevailed around him.

His writings indicate his sensitiveness to the even greater spiritual dangers that lurked in the future; and his effort to draw mankind back to the real Word of God presaged a new Christian era. It is evident that he looked forward to the day when the understanding of the inner meaning of the Word would accomplish what the surface meaning had thus far signally failed to do; to the time when the clergy, enlightened by a new insight into its significance,

would present it in such a way that men could not fail to be impressed, and when the laity, by shunning evils as sins against God, would be able so to cleanse and strengthen society, that the evils present in the world would become lessened in power and some day practically removed. In his writings he has left us an heritage that once understood and applied to life will accomplish all this and more.

WILLIAM CUMMINGS RICHARDSON.

UTILITARIANISM.

By the Rev. Lewis Field Hite.

UTILITARIANISM seems to be practically, if not theoretically, the most generally accepted philosophy of life of the present day. The ever enlarging organization of industry is fast driving the mass of mankind to the position of dependents, seeking a precarious livelihood as mere cogs in a vast and complicated machine. From the deadly monotony of such an existence, men turn for relief and relaxation to all kinds of pleasure seeking. The result is that the great mass of workers live to escape the work and to enjoy the pleasure; they do not go to their work to find vent for their energies and creative capacities, but as a necessary means of subsistence and as a means to pleasure. The utilities of life are thus provided for, but the motive lies beyond in the pleasure to be thus obtained. Under these conditions, pleasure for pleasure's sake tends to become the motive of all human activities, and utilitarianism is the philosophical interpretation and expression of this motive. The most vigorous and eloquent exponent of this philosophy is John Stuart Mill; and his little book "Utilitarianism" is the classic exposition. Utilitarianism is doubtless a strong ingredient in the practical philosophy of all ages, and certainly of our own age in particular. We may therefore quite appropriately take Mill's little book as a characteristic and permanent argument for utilitarianism, and try to examine it critically and exhibit its inadequacy.

The futilities and the inconsistencies of speculative philosophy have always been abhorrent to the English mind. As a protest against juggling with abstractions, Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding" was a powerful and decisive expression of English character, and as such gave

direction to the development of a national philosophy at the same time that it made, in England at least, a new era in the history of metaphysical thinking. Locke's appeal to concrete human experience as the test of theoretical systems, was made a deliberate method and principle in philosophical procedure; and was ably worked out by the "Scottish School," headed by Reid and Stewart. Sir Wm. Hamilton subjected their thought to criticism from the general point of view of the history of philosophy; and Mill in turn examined Hamilton.

Mill was a born agitator and reformer. At the same time he had the true Englishman's grip on common sense. His work in logic was an attempt to bring this science from the region of empty forms to the field of concrete human effort to master the facts of nature; in other words, to make it a method of scientific procedure in the conquest of the physical world. In metaphysics, he was a radical antagonist of apriorism. In philosophy he was the child of his father, who in turn was the heir of Stewart and Reid. But the key to Mill's work, and to his "Utilitarianism" in particular, is the fact that he was a live man, breathing the atmosphere of the humanity of his generation; a man who felt the pulses of human life as it was there and then lived. He was not a mere logician, nor a mere thinker and writer, but a man on fire with the feelings of human hearts. Out of this wealth of human interests and enthusiasm for human welfare and progress, his "Utilitarianism" appeared, first as a series of magazine articles, and afterwards in book form.

Mill was stirred to the depths of his being by the social problems which were so rapidly coming to the front in his day. The struggle for existence, the discontent and the woes of humanity, were a real burden to him. What are men living for; and what is practicable in the actual order of things? It is from the point of view of a soul on fire with human interests that we must read this book. To take it as a piece of scholasticism or as a logical exercise is to

misconceive its meaning altogether. It is a message to the masses, the message of a man who spoke out of heartfelt experience and conviction. Its end is practical, not theoretical. Its aim is to convey and enforce a conviction, not to play with an intellectual puzzle. It is an impressive mass of considerations ordered with reference to practical human interests as these interests are found and fixed in the social organism.

With this impression of the man and his purpose, let us glance at the book in which he concentrated the results of his experience, and spoke the words which told to men what he thought to be the real meaning of life.

Mill went out into the world, came in close contact with the people, saw and felt what was going on in their lives, outside and inside. He himself had deeply felt in his own person the meaning and the urgency of the question,—what is the end of human life? What are the struggling millions living for? What is the actual and practicable object of men's striving? The answer was given in the language of common speech.

Everywhere and at all times, from all quarters far and near, present and past, the question, "How do you like this and that, so and so?" revealed the all-embracing and ever-present and supreme interest of life. "How do you like your new home?" "How do you like your work?" and etc. This question always goes to the bottom of the situation, takes in the whole of it; the rest is only matter of detail. All this means, "How are you *pleased?*" Men are striving for what they like; and when they get it, it is *pleasure.*

The truth of this answer was for Mill not a mere generalization based upon common observation; it was the answer that came out of his own sad heart, longing for escape from its burden of gloom to the joy of life's sunshine. The answer came out of his own heartfelt longing for the joy of life. Common observation made this truth of his own private life the truth of all human life. This

truth Mill set himself with all his energy to convey to men, and along with it an interpretation of the moral and social life of mankind that would bring light and hope as well as a practical purpose. To convey this conviction, Mill conceived it to be necessary only to present it in the concrete, cleared of misconceptions and false associations, and to exhibit it in favorable contrast with rival doctrines. First and foremost he must clear away the rubbish of apriorism. This done, he states his case in view of all the stock objections, then traces the sanctions of his moral law, argues its validity, and finally determines its relation through expediency to justice as an example of *à priori* moral ideas, the type of "moral intuitions.". This simple scheme he filled out with a marvelous wealth of cogent reasonings, telling observations, and luminous interpretations of concrete human experience, with a simple and direct force of language and a brilliancy of thought, that have made this little book a classic and a masterpiece in this field of literature.

Mill well knew the ethical prepossessions of his readers, especially those in professional quarters. The doctrines of the intuitional school and Kantian formalism were loosely combined with common sense in such generalities as dictates of conscience, justice, duty, etc. He had therefore to extricate common sense from this mistaken and mischievous alliance.

The history of ethics showed a vain conflict of opposing doctrines. The attempt to *deduce* moral principles was of a piece with the effort to deduce the principles of science in general. Even the elements of algebra are full of pure fictions, "conventions," and are not at all deductions from *à priori,* self-evident truths. The so-called "first principles" of a science are generalizations and the outcome of analysis. In science, therefore, the particular truths precede the general theory; the value of the conclusions in the special sciences for practical and even for theoretical purposes is not at all affected by the obscurity and confu-

sion of the first principles. But in the field of conduct, the case would seem to be different, for here all hands agree that right and wrong are not matters of direct perception in the particular cases, but they are the issues of judgment, the outcome of the process of bringing the particular case under the general law. Good is not the moral quality of an action in the same sense that green is the visible quality of grass. So right and wrong presuppose a standard.

A science of morals implies an organized body of moral principles in which the ordinary moral maxims and recognized moral laws have their determined place in relation to one supreme and controlling principle. All systems must and do lay claim to the possession of such a principle, those assuming a natural moral faculty, a native intuition, or instinct, as well as those which hold that moral principles grow out of observation and experience. Those who hold that moral principles are original data of the moral consciousness recognize this requirement, and nevertheless fail to give a list of such principles, much less do they bring them into order and subordination to the highest. What they do is to assume the common moral maxims as of *à priori* authority, or they take some generality which proves to be of less authority than the maxims, and which consequently never succeeds in gaining popular acceptance.

The absence of a recognized standard or first principle, has no doubt done much to impair and unsettle the moral beliefs of mankind; but in practice the bad results of this absence have been mitigated by the silent influence of a standard not recognized but still everywhere operative. Although the lack of an acknowledged ultimate standard has made ethics more a means of sanctioning moral sentiments than a positive guide to conduct, nevertheless these sentiments themselves have been largely influenced in their formation and growth by consideration of the *effects* of *action* upon *happiness;* and this consideration has entered decisively into the formation and justification of the moral

doctrines of all schools. In this consideration even the *categorical imperative* finds its practical validity—or its vacuity.

The theory that conduct is good or bad according to its relation to happiness is the utilitarian theory. Whether the theory be true or not cannot be, strictly speaking, proved, for the reason that the supreme good cannot be brought under a higher conception, and shown to agree with it or to be contained in it. In other words, the ethical standard is not deducible. But nevertheless utilitarianism may be asserted as a comprehensive formula to be accepted or rejected on the ground of convincing considerations. This is proof in a larger meaning of the word.

The chief obstacle in the way of its reception is that it is variously misunderstood. The formula itself needs first to be stated, cleared of misconceptions, vindicated from objections; and then those considerations need to be presented which will serve to show its validity and its sanction.

What, then, is utilitarianism? At the outset we must put aside the common and gross misconceptions, on the one hand that it opposes utility to pleasure, and on the other, that it identifies it with pleasure pure and simple in its mere animal forms. Utility, in this theory, means pleasure and exemption from pain. It includes the agreeable and ornamental, the pleasures of art and the higher satisfactions of life. According to utilitarianism, actions are right as they promote happiness, and wrong as they tend to produce unhappiness. By happiness is meant pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness pain and the privation of pleasure. Pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends. All desirable things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in them, as means to pleasure or to the prevention of pain.

The first impression which such a bald and bold statement of the doctrine makes is a shock to the moral consciousness; and the natural reaction of the moral conscious-

ness upon it, is expressed by the epithet applied to the Epicureans of old, "swinish." But a little reflection corrects this impression. The doctrine is not swinish for the simple reason that men are not swine, and human pleasures are different in kind from those of swine. When men once taste the higher pleasures, they prefer them. Utilitarianism grades pleasures by differences of quality. These differences of quality are recognized and exhibited in the fact of preference. In other words, by virtue of the possession of superior qualities, certain pleasures are preferred by superior men, and the superiority of the man is established by considerations *ab extra*.

If we are asked to name the highest pleasure, and arrange the others in order, the answer is: Pleasure is a quality of feeling, and as such cannot be described except in terms of the modes of existence in which the pleasures are felt; and these preferable modes of existence are such as bring into activity the higher faculties; and the sense of possession of these higher faculties, and the pleasure felt in their exercise, form the ground of preferring one mode of existence to another after both have been experienced.

Given the higher faculties and the opportunity for their exercise, the higher pleasures may be and should be chosen, and as a matter of fact are chosen, except in certain cases; but even in these the superiority of the higher pleasures is recognized. For example, a man may live the life of a drunkard, recognizing all the time that a sober life is better, and its enjoyment should be chosen. In other cases, there is either incapacity, or lack of opportunity.

Pleasures have intensity, and they have duration; but these characters are not the ground of preference, nor can they be made a basis of an orderly arrangement of pleasures, for pleasures are discrete qualities of feeling and as such cannot be compared objectively, although subjectively they are distinctly felt as different. This feeling of difference is expressed in language, laws, institutions, and modes of conduct, as results of the preference of those who

are competent to perceive the qualities and their differences. If therefore we want to know the scale of pleasures, we must look to the modes of conduct in which the pleasures are felt, and observe the order in which experience has arranged them. This order is not fixed and final, because man is in the process of moral development; but it is authoritative pending further development.

This way of conceiving the moral standard is a necessary part of the utilitarian theory. The moral man must choose the preferred pleasures, i.e., those preferred by the competent; and further, his moral aim should be to bring about the result that such preferred pleasures are preferred by all. In other words, he must seek not merely, not mainly, his own happiness, but must strive to make happiness abound in all men, and not only in men but in all sentient creatures, all subjects of happiness.

It may be objected that this doctrine is untenable because happiness is not attainable, and therefore cannot be a rational end of human conduct. Even if this objection were valid, still utilitarianism would have the task of mitigating unhappiness. But the objection rests on a misconception. By happiness utilitarianism does not mean a continuous state of exalted pleasure, of eternal rapture, but a life of many and various pleasures, and of few and transitory pains. Now such a life is to a considerable extent already actual, and by the exercise of wise energy, may be made the lot of almost all. Poverty, disease and the vicissitudes of fortune, as experience shows, gradually give way before the advance of science and wisely directed effort. Human history exhibits, in a measure, a progressive victory over evil, and the steady growth of good. The constitution of the world and of human society favors the pursuit of happiness.

Here again it may be objected that happiness so conceived would not be satisfactory as the end of human life. In other words, life would not be worth living in view of such an end. The answer is that as a matter of fact the

mass of mankind prefer to live with much less actual enjoyment of happiness than the ideal presents. It is only selfishness that can make such a life seem intolerable. Given a fair degree of mental cultivation and human interest, life, even under the present faulty conditions of social and intellectual organization, is abundantly capable of guiding a large surplus of pleasure.

It is quite true that under the present imperfect conditions of human life, the readiness to do without happiness is a virtue of the highest order; but in this case one merely sacrifices his own happiness for that of others. Self-sacrifice for its own sake is utterly vain. It is only as it tends to increase the sum total of happiness that it has any moral worth.

Utilitarianism is neither aceticism nor selfishness. It aims at the largest possible sum total of happiness, and is strictly impartial as between the "I" and the "Thou." To love one's neighbor as oneself is the ideal of utilitarian morality. It demands that the laws and the social order place the interests of the individual in harmony with those of the whole. It looks to public opinion and to education for the establishment, in the mind of each, of an intimate and indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole, so that in every thought and impulse his own good will be seen and sought in the public good and the public good in his own. This does not mean, as some infer, that the utilitarian must in every case work out the consequences of his act in the wide field of the public good. Under ordinary circumstances, the field of conduct is narrowed to one's immediate relations, and only these need be considered; furthermore, in the practical working of any system of morality well established secondary principles are available, and are sufficient as a guide in most cases. It is only on rare occasions that the general public must come under consideration, or that recourse must be had to the ultimate standard.

This, however, is by no means the same as to act merely

from expediency,—taken in the sense of sacrificing the larger interests for momentary, personal, or class, advantage. And yet expediency cannot be ruled out in dealing with particular cases. For example, to tell a lie is generally immoral because it destroys the virtue of veracity; but in special cases it may be a means to one's own or another's good, when the good is a part of the good of the whole.

This in brief and in substance is Mill's statement and defense of his doctrine. It is impossible to do justice to the variety of aspects to practical life which he brings forward and works into his argument. Even such objections as that utilitarianism makes men cold and unsympathizing by taking actions and not persons into consideration; also that it is a Godless doctrine (whereas it assumes that God desires above all things the happiness of His creatures); and finally that it opens the way for casuistry and subterfuge,—all these are met. To this last it may be said that no creed is a safeguard against excuses for evil-doing. They spring out of human nature and the complexities and difficulties of concrete situations. But even here utilitarianism has the advantage of offering an ultimate standard of a definite and concrete nature.

This, then, is the doctrine. What is its sanction? Wherein consists the obligation to aim at increasing the sum total of happiness? This question is bound to arise in any system of ethics. In the case of the ordinary moral precepts, the obligation is felt; and when the attempt is made to derive the feeling (obligation) from some higher principle, and finally from an ultimate principle, the question will arise, Why should the feeling attend this principle, when as a matter of fact it seems not to do so? Here the question as to the nature of this feeling comes forward. In the first place this feeling is the source of praise and blame; and these characteristics naturally attach themselves to conduct which does or does not tend to promote happiness. So far, then, the utilitarian standard has the sanction

of these two characteristics of any ethical standard. In the second place, the feeling of obligation has its internal sanction in the complex mass of feeling we call conscience. Whatever ideas one may have as to the nature of moral obligation, whether he holds it to be a transcendental fact, or an innate feeling, the force which really urges him is always his own subjective feeling, and this feeling may attach itself to the pleasures and pains of others as well as to any other object. Therefore, whatever additional efficacy the internal sanction may derive from the transcendental origin of moral obligation, utilitarianism has the benefit of it. But it is unnecessary to trace the feeling of obligation to any transcendental origin. It is sufficient to regard it as a natural outgrowth of human faculty. Like other activities, it springs up spontaneously and may be cultivated in almost any direction. It may therefore be associated with utility. To be effective this association must rest upon the basis of natural sentiment. This basis exists in the social feelings and relations of mankind.

The feeling of unity which grows out of the necessary recognition of common interests in social life, tends to be more fully established as civilization advances; and it thus becomes an impulsive and rational force which binds each to all and all to each in such a way that each seeks and possesses his own good in that of others, and the good of others in his own; and, since, good is pleasure or happiness, the sum total of happiness in the whole becomes inevitably the paramount end sanctioned by the conviction on the part of each that the structure of social life is such that his aim must coincide with that of others, that there must be unity of purpose on the part of all the members of the social group. With this conviction, and with all the forces of human nature working in its favor, the utilitarian principle comes forward as the fully established and clearly vindicated ultimate moral standard.

So far the principle of utilitarianism has been asserted, cleared of misconceptions and defended from objections.

Its sufficiency as a moral standard has been argued, and its practical character has been exhibited. All this has proceeded on the basis of the simple assertion of the proposition, "Pleasure is, and ought to be, the end of human conduct, since it is the only thing that is desired as an end." This is the assertion. What is its proof?

In the first place, it is an obvious fact that each person desires pleasure as a good; and if so, then all do, and pleasure is desired as a good by all. But people desire other things; for example, virtue, fame, health, power, money, etc.; and the question arises, What one among the things so desired, is the most worthy, the most desirable? Any of these may be desired in and for itself; but (as for example money) they are first desired as a means and afterwards as an end. So of virtue; it is first desired as a means to happiness, and then as a part of it, and so for its own sake. In this case, therefore, it is really happiness that is desired all the while from beginning to end. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and virtue, health, wealth, etc., are some of its parts. Virtue is peculiar in being purely a means of blessing to others, and is not liable to become hurtful in its consequences. So utilitarianism regards virtue as the most desirable of all the parts of happiness, and enjoins that it be desired for its own sake. Nevertheless those who desire it for its own sake, desire it because the consciousness of it is a pleasure. If it gave no pleasure, it would not be desired except as a means. From this it results that happiness alone is desired originally and solely for its own sake.

This result is ultimately a question of fact to be determined by self-observation; and the verdict of self-observation is that to desire a thing and to desire it as pleasant, or to think of an object as desirable and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing. It is a psychological impossibility to desire a thing apart from the anticipation of pleasure.

It may be said, however, that granted that only pleasure is desirable still the end of action is what is willed, not what is desired. Will and desire are different. The virtuous man wills his conduct without primary regard to pleasure or pain. But this is due to habit. The habit is valuable as a means to good, i.e., to happiness. The will which becomes habitual in this way began in desire, and in the desire for pleasure. It becomes free from desire only by habit; and then we may desire our end because we will it. In this case, however, the virtuous habit exists for the sake of happiness, and so even here the utilitarian doctrine is confirmed; and the assertion that pleasure alone is desirable as an end stands, and the principle of utilitarianism is proved.

Here, strictly speaking, the discussion ends; but inasmuch as the utilitarian standard is to many minds brought in question by its contrast with the idea of justice, it is necessary to consider the latter idea, and see how it stands related to utility. If justice is *sui generis,* a peculiar rational instinct, then it would seem that its object must be some distinctive character of actions, revealed through and to this instinct; but if it can be shown to be a certain combination of qualities presented under a peculiar aspect, then we may trace its genesis in relation to growth of morality, and so discover its connection with utility.

If we review the classes of cases in which the word "justice" is used, we find that the courts of law furnish us with its characteristic application; and here it is associated with two primitive conceptions, the conception of rights inhering in persons, and the conception of punishment for the violation of such rights. The idea of punishment grows out of the impulse of self-defence, or the feeling of sympathy. The sentiment of justice originates in the natural impulse to repel attack, resent a wrong, to retaliate. The feeling of sympathy extends these impulses to cases when the wrong is done to others. In this extension the natural feeling becomes moralized, and made to respond to the

demands of the common good. So the desire to punish becomes just. But punishment to be just must recognize the rights inherent in all the persons concerned. Every person must count for one, and no more. Equality of treatment is the law of justice. The practical application of the law brings it into the field of expediency; and in this field social utility alone must determine what is just in the particular case. In this concrete sense, justice is a name for a certain most important group of social utilities, a certain region in the wider field of expediency. As such it fits into the utilitarian scheme.

In attempting to criticize this book, it is important to recall certain impressions that were confessed at the outset. In the first place, it was written in conscious opposition to certain prevailing schools of philosophical speculation, namely, the Kantian and the English Intuitionists, and in conscious conformity with the common sense philosophy of the Scottish School. Furthermore, Mill was a radical empiricist, and a deadly foe to apriorism. But most of all he was a humanitarian. He lived in sympathetic touch with the joys and woes of humanity. He was a thorough-going optimist and a social reformer. The spirit of democracy and the idea of social equality filled him with enthusiasm. Human happiness was what he longed for, worked for, and wrote for. He believed it to be possible and practicable in much larger measure than was actually realized. His conscience told him to work for it. His book carried his message and his hope. It was addressed to the people, to throw light upon their life, and to inspire them with hope and clear purpose. His book is rich in luminous interpretation and in concrete interests. In it he gathers up his strong personality with its great wealth of experience, and puts it forth in fresh, impressive, and eloquent language.

Mill has unquestionably presented in an admirable way the high requirements of an ethical standard. Whether we agree that pleasure is the true end of human conduct

or not, he has gathered around it the main requisites of a good life. He finds a place in his system for all that men have proved by experience to be of most worth. His analysis of the moral act may or may not be faulty; but at least he has placed that act in the social system so firmly and so significantly, that we may well despair of ever describing it more fittingly.

The moral tone of the book is certainly invigorating and charming. No one can read it attentively, and rise from its perusal without fresh impulse, if not fresh light. But all this is apart from the truth of his central assertion; and it calls attention to the misleading title he has chosen. Utilitarianism naturally suggests that the principle meant is *utility*, not pleasure. I cannot help suspecting that Mill was all the while playing fast and loose with these terms. The words pleasure, happiness, the common good, and utility, play with each other all through the book in a very puzzling fashion. It is in just such ambiguities that Mill, turning his back on the formalities of Scholasticism, keeps close to common sense, and makes his book a true mirror of human life. For in this way, he gathers together the intricately woven lines of association which connect these words in practical life, and so draws the unsuspecting reader to his view with all the forces of his natural prepossessions. Practically Mill's system is hardly at all affected by the denial of his principle; for it is clear that, whether pleasure is really the moral end or not, it is an inevitable accompaniment of the realization of the end, whatever it may be. In other words, the end, whatever it may be, cannot be realized without the accompanying pleasure; nor can the pleasure be gained without realizing the end. Here too ambiguity has favored Mill's statement. But the main strength of Mill's argument comes from the ambiguity in his use of the words "pleasure" and "utility." By using now one and now the other to designate his principle, he gets all the practical advantage of Hedonism, at the same time clearing it of all damaging associations by bringing it

into the field of *use,* and thereby securing all the good which belongs there. This no doubt was far from being intentional on Mill's part. It was the spontaneous outgrowth and expression of his moral nature, and of his experience of moral life; but it does show a lack of critical reflection.

I have already more than once called attention to Mill's relation to the "common sense philosophy" of the Scottish School, and to his inveterate opposition to apriorism. From the theoretical point of view, though probably not from the practical and literary, this was a fatal weakness. If in his study of Hamilton Mill had followed out the significance of his author's historical and critical tendencies, and not remained bound by a personal prejudice, he might easily have transcended this weakness and come into possession of a critical insight that would have been a powerful instrument for his moral earnestness. But this he apparently failed to do, and the result is as we have it,—a result which would be very different in form if not in substance, if he had really mastered the critical philosophy of Kant and the epistemology of Hegel. Although it may seem little short of an outrage to dissect the live body of Mill's structure, so full of the pulse and breath of humanity, with the apparatus of critical philosophy, yet it may be worth while to do so for the sake of bringing to clear light the real germ of truth that was working half consciously in his mind.

If we collect the threads of Mill's argument, and try to put the finger on the vital spot, we must soon see that the region is covered by the phrase "the common good." The fact that makes man to be moral is voluntary and rational membership in a social group. Moral conduct is the pursuit of ends in which the interests of others are recognized. Now Mill clearly and forcibly brings out this fact. But here lies the important ambiguity. This "interest of others" he sometimes calls pleasure; but he more often leaves it standing as *mere* interest. Now the question arises, Is this

interest merely pleasure, or does the word "interest" carry a meaning and association that do not belong to pleasure at all? I should now attempt to show that the latter alternative is true.

First, I must examine the argument which is used to prove that pleasure alone is desired as an end. It rests on the simple psychological observation that to desire an object and to feel it as pleasant are one and the same thing.

To desire a thing, and to find it pleasant, are two modes of naming the same psychological fact. To think of an object as desirable, and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing. To desire anything apart from the idea of it as pleasant, is a psychological impossibility. Mill tries very hard here to be clear and precise, but he does not escape ambiguity. (See Everyman's Library edition, 1897, page 58.) In the first place, the object to be desired or to be pleasant must be presented in idea; but as merely presented it is neither desired nor pleasant. It is impossible, then, that the object as presented merely, and before the rise of desire, could be identical with pleasure; and so in desiring the object we cannot be *ipso facto* desiring pleasure. In the second place, suppose the object presented, the question arises, Is it desired and then pleasant, or pleasant and then desired; or finally, is its being desired and its pleasantness the same thing. The last is Mill's assertion; but observe that he does not escape the facts that the object is desired, and that the object is different from the pleasure it gives. Thirdly, in order to make out the case for hedonism, it must be asserted that the object is pleasant and then desired; in other words, it is desired because it is pleasant, or for the sake of the pleasure it gives. Now this is a very plausible assertion, and one which it has always been hard to deny squarely. Fourthly, supposing the object presented, is it pleasant before it is thought of as possessed, or is it the thought of its possession that gives pleasure?

There seem to be two fundamental organic activities,—expansion and contraction. Grasping food and directing

the attention are examples of the first; withdrawing from hurtful contact and flight are examples of the other. Pleasure and pain accompany these activities respectively. But the object presented is different from pleasure or pain; and yet we say that the organism seeks pleasure and avoids pain. The chick pecks at any object indifferently and tries to swallow it. Is it seeking pleasure? The question seems to be, What determines originally the reaction upon the presented object? Does its touch give pleasure, and then the pleasure become the object sought in the act of expansion; or does the act of expansion, grasping, etc., follow immediately upon touch, contact, and then the pleasure accompanying the expansion? In other words, is the object pleasant before or after it is gained, or thought of as possessed?

Reflection as well as the spontaneous use of language shows that pleasure accompanies successful activity and possession, and cannot exist anterior to these either in fact or in idea. Action and possession presuppose desire, and so also pleasure. In other words, the object is desired directly and immediately; and pleasure supervenes upon the thought of approach or possession. Of course, the object of desire may be pleasure; but it also may not be pleasure. And the moral question is, Which ought it to be? If we take it as pleasure, we encounter two objections: first, pleasure is realizable only as a vanishing series of pleasures which cannot be summed, and therefore as an end it is unattainable unapproachable and impossible; second, it is immoral, for it admits of no criterion other than an external one, and so it obliterates the distinction between good and evil. If pleasures are graded with reference to an external standard, then pleasure is no longer the standard, or the moral end.

If we take pleasure as the feeling of self-realization, we reintroduce all the difficulties of the original situation as between desire and pleasure; and hedonism may assert that, as between self-realization and pleasure as the moral end,

it is a matter of indifference, since the pleasure and the self-realization are always coincident. And here hedonism may claim the advantage of a simple and concrete fact as its end; whereas self-realization is definable only in terms of an ideal object infinitely remote, or else in terms of pleasure itself. Against self-realization hedonism may urge the objection that it is pure selfishness, and therefore immoral. It is true that the notion of self may be enlarged so as to include the interests of others. But both in theory and in practice, the decisive crisis is bound to come, when the interests of self are opposed to those of others. The feeling of self is the feeling of absolute individuality. Its relation to other individualities as a whole is conditioned upon its own sense of separateness and distinctness. The fiction of an ideal unity of the self is unavailable and immoral, for the reason that it obliterates the real distinction between the "I" and the "Thou," and makes the ultimate criterion of conduct a subjective feeling in which the distinction between good and bad disappears. On the other hand, hedonism maintains the distinction between the "I" and the "Thou," and extends the notion of pleasure to include that of others.

At this point, we come back to Mill's utilitarianism, and we must in fairness admit that it has the merit of moral quality to the extent that it recognizes and may aim at the good of others, who are really others.

This brings us finally to consider the word "utility" as used in Mill's system. Now it is clear that this word names a quality of conduct. In the utilitarian scheme, it is that quality of conduct by virtue of which it is related to pleasure, including the pleasure of others. But we have already seen that, in taking pleasure as the only possible end of human action, utilitarianism rests upon a psychological error. It is also clear that pleasure does not meet the requirements of an ethical standard. Attention to the point will show that the word "utility" is the significant word in Mill's scheme. Why not take it so? If this is the word

which gathers up all that is distinctive and of most value in the system, why not say, "Utility is the real and true moral end, and conduct is moral in proportion as it is *useful;* and just as this is what Mill was trying to say all the time, so this is what the moral consciousness in history has been meaning to declare"? This is what I think should be maintained.

LEWIS F. HITE.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT

CREATION OR EVOLUTION.

THERE is a real alternative here, more real than appears to a superficial view. The alternative involves a deep seated opposition in principle and in fundamental presuppositions. The acceptance of evolution is the rejection of creation; on the other hand the acceptance of creation excludes evolution by definition and method.

In the popular mind this alternative is obscured by the fact that the word evolution is used with many different meanings, by the confusion of naturalistic and religious motives, and by the confident rhetoric of evolutionistic propaganda. It requires some historical and rational analysis to disentangle these various motives and influences, and to become aware of the principles involved.

In current discussion of evolution in its significance for science and religion, the issues are disastrously confused. In the first place, the issue is prejudiced by the confident assertion, reiterated endlessly, that evolution is a fact, and that every well informed person knows it to be a fact. This attitude assumes all knowledge for the one side and puts all ignorance with the other, and it is natural for people who are not given to special study to stand with those who know. It is easy to show that this is an ambiguous or a reckless assertion, and contradicted by further statements of those who make it with authority. In the next place, evolution is proclaimed on the overwhelming authority of science. Those who make this appeal do not seem to be aware that they are reverting to what they arrogantly call "mediævalism," to the principle of unquestionable authority. As a matter of fact, science has little or nothing to say about evolution, and this is obvious when it is recognized that evolu-

tion is a philosophical postulate, an abstract ideal, a scientific hypothesis, if you please, but not an observed fact.

Another source of serious confusion is the contention in some quarters that evolution is God's method of creation. This claim tends to prejudice many in favor of evolution and to blind them as to the grounds upon which it is accepted by those who have direct access to the facts and are familiar with the methods of interpretation. If evolution were a fact, we would of course have to accept it as such; but if it is not a fact, then we would be committing our religion to a dangerous and mischievous theory, and would be placing the responsibility for our mischief upon God, rather than upon our own ill-considered judgments.

Still another fruitful source of confusion and prejudice is the current identification of the doctrine of evolution with the whole body of natural science, thereby giving to the doctrine all the authority and importance of science in general. Accordingly, the teaching of evolution is confused with the teaching of science, and to question either the fact or the theory of evolution is made equivalent to questioning the truth of science, and denounced as absurd and barbarous, as an attack on the freedom of teaching and as opposing the progress of science. This attitude is an exhibition of ignorance and intolerance, and an evidence of confusion of thought far exceeding what has been attributed to the "theologians."

In view of the above considerations, it is a matter of no little difficulty to approach the alternative of creation or evolution with unprejudiced directness. It involves laying aside a vast weight of authority, and going back to the plain records of history.

First of all, we must ask the deliberate and pertinent question, is evolution a fact, and upon what grounds is it to be treated as fact. If it is, that of itself brings it within the province of science; and furthermore, if it is really a fact, then we must, as Christians, accept it as God's method of creation and the alternative between creation and evolution disappears.

Before we press the question as to the fact, we must make

clear and precise just what we mean by evolution. The word evolution is used loosely both in scientific language and in popular language with a variety of meanings. It may mean progress in general, or any progressive change; it may mean almost any kind of improvement; it may mean nothing more than growth. We speak of the evolution of the human race, meaning the progress of civilization; we speak of the evolution of the steam engine, meaning the series of improvements that have been made in the manufacture of steam engines; we speak of the evolution of the chick from the egg to the full grown fowl; in biology, we speak of the evolution of plants and animals in general, meaning the process by which all plants and animals have descended genetically from primitive organisms, more specifically the process by which one species passed into the next in the order of succession. If, therefore, any one says he believes in evolution, it is proper to ask in what sense is he using the word. He may believe in cosmical evolution, the course of change by which the stars, the solar system, and the earth have come to be what they are from immense masses of highly heated matter. But without specification, he naturally includes biological evolution, the evolution of plants and animals in a continuous series by generation from the simplest organic forms to the highest and most complex, from amoeba to man. Naturalists have undertaken to arrange plants and animals in genetic order, and have made genealogical trees to represent the arrangement.

Recurring to the question of fact, it is obvious that in the nature of the case evolution is not a matter of direct observation, for the simple reason that the process is supposed to have taken place in pre-historic ages. No well supported claim is made that evolution has taken place within the period of history. If, however, the process of evolution actually took place in the past and is really a law of nature, as is asserted, then it ought to be going on now; the fact that it is not observable within the period of history leaves us no ground for supposing that it occurred at any time.

When we stop to consider the case carefully, and reflect that

evolution is certainly not an *observed* fact, we are led to enquire what it is that people mean by saying that evolution is a fact. It is usually recognized and admitted that no such process has been actually observed. What well informed scientists do mean and what they do assert is that the fact of evolution is inferred on the basis of abundant evidence. This is a significant and crucial change of position. To admit that evolution is not an observed fact, and to claim only that it is a valid inference, is taking a long step towards clearing the situation, and leaves the question of evidence for the belief open to free and unprejudiced discussion.

On what ground, then, is it asserted, or believed, that evolution is a fact? Several lines of evidence are presented: paleontology, morphology, embryology, the facts of classification, and geographical distribution. All these lines of evidence are supposed to converge to the conclusion that evolution is a fact. It is unnecessary for the purpose in hand to follow out these several lines of argument, for the one and sufficient reason that biologists, Darwin among them, admit that the validity of all the arguments depends upon the facts of paleontology. This is obvious from the consideration that evolution is not observed to take place within the field of history.

Turning then to the facts of paleontology, we are struck first of all by the comparative scantiness of the record. Prior to the proterozoic age, no fossils appear, though indirect traces of life are found in certain rock formations. Within the proterozoic age, rare and poorly preserved fossils of crustacea and the like have been found. In the Cambrian rocks of the succeeding, paleozoic, age there are abundant fossils of trilobites and other shell fish. In the later periods of this age fish, amphibians, and vertebrates appear successively. It is estimated that life has existed on the earth 500,000,000 years. The duration of the proterozoic age is estimated at 50,000,000 years and that of the paleozoic at 8,000,000. During this immense stretch of time these separate and distinct groups of animals appear suddenly and at long intervals without any transitional forms. If evolution were a fact at that time, it is curious that

during these immense intervals no fossils appear. Just as sudden and at long intervals is the appearance of birds and mammals. So far as the record speaks, evolution began with a multitude of highly organized animals of which the prototypes and the transitional stages are "pure conjecture." Not only this, but the history of the formation of the earth's crust is so complicated, the order of the strata is so difficult to determine, that after generations of labor, geologists are still working for the most part with tentative theories; they are driven to the awkward extremity of determining on occasion, the order of the strata by the order of the fossils, and the order of the fossils by the order of the strata. The truth is that the whole system of geology and of paleontology is largely the work of the constructive imagination. The bearing of this conclusion is that the dogma of evolution is based in the last analysis upon faith alone. If any one is inclined to the belief in evolution, he may fortify his belief by an appeal to the facts of geology and paleontology, but he cannot avoid the alternative of true or false interpretation. It may be granted that the paleontological record does indeed indicate a progressive series from simple to complex, but the immense gaps between the separate terms should forbid over confidence in filling in the gaps with imaginary creatures. The absence of transitional forms would seem to be conclusive, for if there were in fact such forms, there is no reason to suppose that they would not have been preserved along with those which actually left their imprints. However, the lack of positive evidence does not eliminate the possibility, and if the series suggests to the biologist the continuity of organic development, there can be no reasonable objection from the scientific point of view to his making it his aim and effort to establish the continuity. As a purely scientific matter, the biologist is free to pursue the best methods available. The best test of a method is to push it to the extreme. If it turns out to be on the wrong track, the method may be changed and a new aim adopted.

The evolutionistic method and the resulting conclusions would arouse little interest outside scientific circles, if con-

fined to the natural history of plants and animals. Most people would accept without special concern the teaching that plants and animals descended through the process of gradual change from primitive organisms. All this discussion of the history of organic forms, and even of the origin of species, lies within the science of biology. But the question of the origin of species was extended to include man, and it came as a shock to the moral and religious conscience of people when it was asserted that men descended from monkeys, or from monkey ancestry. At this point, the theories and conclusions of the biologists were challenged and resented by the great mass of educated and cultivated people. Charles Darwin's painstaking investigations were hailed as conclusive by a group of enthusiastic and eloquent biologists of whom T. H. Huxley was the most prominent and most effective exponent. An astounding evolutionistic propaganda ensued which deeply aroused the moral and religious sentiments of people and precipitated a fierce conflict, miscalled a conflict between religion and science. It was in reality a conflict between two groups, or several groups, of scientists, a conflict which is still waging.

The real issue was and is the origin of man, and it is at this point that the alternative between creation and evolution is most acute. Naturalists formerly pointed their argument by arranging the skeletons of men and monkeys in order, and then confidently exhibited the origin of man from the monkey. But further investigation and a constant fire of criticism compelled them to abandon this position and fall back on the theory that man's origin goes back to an earlier form from which both man and monkey evolved. The argument for the evolution of man rests, so far as it rests upon facts at all, upon the recent discovery of a few fossils widely separated in space and time.

In 1891, Dr. Eugène Dubois discovered in Java a mass of mamalian fossils, among them fragments that had the appearance of the top part of a skull, also a thigh bone and two teeth. The fossils were found in volcanic material, and were referred to the early pleistocene or pliocene. With these three separate pieces Dubois and McGregor built up a man, called

since *Pithecanthropos* (Apeman) and proclaimed as the long sought missing link between man and monkey. The date assigned for the period of this man is 500,000 years ago. The pleistocene era is estimated to have lasted between 400,000 and 1,400,000 years. It is remarkable that in all this period only this single specimen has been found.

Assigned to a period 250,000 years later, there were found in 1913 in the gravel plateau of Piltdown, England, fossil fragments of a skull and jaw. The fragments were put together by Smith-Woodward of the British Museum. Most of the skull was reconstituted, and on this basis the whole man was rebuilt, the so-called *eoanthropos* (dawn-man). In 1907, there was found in the sand of the pleistocene age, near Heidelberg, Germany, the fossil of a well preserved jaw with all the teeth. Out of this was constructed the "Heidelberg man."

In 1856, fossils of human remains were found in a cave in the Neanderthal valley, near Düsseldorf, Germany. Since then the fossils of fifteen other men, women, and children of the same race have been found in various localities throughout Europe. These people are supposed to have lived about 100,000 years ago. Finally, fossil remains have been found in Wales, France, and Spain, and have been assigned to a period 25,000 years ago. They are called the Cro-magnon people and are supposed to be the ancestors of the present race of men.

On the basis of this meager record, isolated fossil fragments, separated by great distances, and hundreds of thousands of years apart in time, naturalists boldly undertake to construct the theory of the continuous descent of man from ape-like ancestors. With this record before us, we are free to draw our own conclusions, and to take the conjectures and reconstructions for what they are worth. Certainly, we cannot accept such evidence as proof.

We are then justified in the conclusion that there is no valid ground for asserting that evolution is a fact, nevertheless it may be fairly claimed that the evidence is sufficient to warrant us in holding to the theory. There is no doubt that the theory of evolution has greatly stimulated biological investigation and

thought, whether fruitfully or otherwise. It is also true that the theory offers a convenient way of thinking about the natural history of plants and animals. As a purely scientific theory and as a principle of scientific method it may be the best available for the time being. But there are other aspects and characters of the theory which are more serious. A theory has inevitably practical, and moral and spiritual consequences, as well as intellectual. There may be such a thing as a pure science, mathematics for instance, but there is no such thing as a pure scientist. Every scientist is a practical, moral, and spiritual agent, and as such he is accountable for his practice, his words, and his spirit; and what is true of the man is true of his theory, or theories. It is the practical, moral, and spiritual bearing of the theory of evolution which we may properly question and which furnishes reasonable grounds for opposing it. In spite of the lack of satisfactory evidence, if it is really true that evolution is a fact, then of course we must in the end adapt ourselves to the fact, but in the meantime we are confronted with the character of the theory.

The theory of evolution is an integral and characteristic feature of modern science. Science in general is a specialized and highly developed part of our experience, the experience of mankind as a whole. As such it is the organized result of processes of abstraction, selective attention, and consistently specialized effort. With the growth of experience, selective attention has been more and more directed to meeting the demands of practical life, and afterwards to attaining clearness and definiteness of knowledge and thought. Experience obtained through the senses early became attached to outer objects, which were fixed and regular, with definite positions in space and time. In this way a large body of experience became objectified, and was made a realm of special interest and importance; it contained the body of our practical life and the whole body of our knowledge of the external world, specifically the world of physical bodies and their behavior. This externalizing of attention, interest, and activity has been immensely promoted by the wide and far reaching systematiza-

tion of the natural sciences, especially astronomy, physics, and mechanics. The practical applications of these sciences have been so amazing and profitable that they have caught the imagination of people of all classes. The principles of science have taken possession of men's minds, and form the background of every day thinking as well as of most systematic thinking. The narrowed field of objective knowledge and the still further specialized fields of the physical sciences have emphasized in science in general and even in common knowledge the abstract and methodized character. The result has been a type of thinking and a type of method which proceeds by way of analysis from the concrete to the abstract and ends in the world of "the elements," the assumed final constituents of reality, a purely mechanical world. The first principle of this type is that explanation as well as description, within the field of nature especially, must be sought by the method of mechanics. The constitution and behavior of bodies must be understood in terms of mechanics. Heat, light, electricity, growth and decay, life and death must in the last analysis be reduced to mechanical operations. This amounts to referring every fact and function of nature to matter and motion, the proper realm of mechanics, and the foundation of materialism. In short, the science of mechanics rests upon the presuppositions of materialism, and the fundamental presuppositions of materialism are that matter and motion are eternal, without beginning, without end, the only primitive realities. This is the position to which early Greek philosophy came in the hands of Leucippus and Democritus; and, as is shown by the course of history, it is the position to which all mechanistic science and philosophy must come. Cases in point are: the present day atomic theory, the cell theory and the theory of heredity, biochemistry, physiological psychology, and behaviorism; all these are controlled and directed by the mechanical ideal. The fixedness of matter and the uniformity of the behavior of bodies are the corner stones of materialism. From these come the so-called laws of nature, the laws of mechanics, the conservation of matter, or mass, the conservation of energy, and

the uniformity of nature. These laws control scientific procedure in the field of nature; under the dominion of these laws every natural object is investigated as to its constitution and behavior. The earth, the bodies of plants and animals, all the heavenly bodies, are reduced to atoms and molecules, and finally to electrons and protons. In the last analysis, the entire universe is an indefinitely extended and monotonous system of moving particles. This is the universal type of simplification, the necessary outcome of applying mechanical principles to the world of concrete experience. For this mechanical insight, all the bodies we see and touch and handle, all the bodies we know concretely, with their properties and qualities and changes, are lost to view; the stars, the sky, the clouds, the water and earth, the rocks and mountains, the green fields and silvery lakes, the flowering plants and the cattle upon a thousand hills do not appear. Only the immense waste and meaningless dance of swirling particles. A return from this world of abstractions to the world of concrete nature and of man is inconceivable. The chemist takes a given quantity of water, passes an electric current through it, and shows you a definite amount of two gases; he tells you that he has resolved the molecules of water into atoms of oxygen and hydrogen. He then mixes the gases, passes an electric spark through them, and shows you a little water; then he tells you that he has combined two atoms of hydrogen with one atom of oxygen to make the water. But the water and the gases are concrete bodies with known properties, qualities, and functions, with specific modes of behavior; the atoms and molecules are products of the constructive imagination, they have no properties except the properties of mass and motion. Water thought of as a mechanical system of moving particles is not the water we drink, any more than light thought of as a system of vibrating ether particles is the light we see. There is no conceivable transition from one to the other, one is in the abstract world of mechanical systems, the other is in the world of concrete experience. It is one of the marvels of fact that these two worlds are connected in ways so uniform and important. The explanation

is that the abstractions are derived from the concrete world, in the first instance, but this explains also why the concrete world cannot be reconstructed with the abstractions.

The theory of evolution is a case of trying to build up the concrete universe from the abstractions of mechanical theory; it undertakes to show how the concrete universe built itself up of electrons, protons, atoms, molecules, particles, and further combinations. At one stage, organic forms appeared, but the organic body, the amoeba for instance thought of as a "stationary vortex" of atoms and molecules is something utterly different from the amoeba which the biologist examines with his microscope. It may be that the body of the amoeba is properly analyzable by the principles of mechanics into atoms and molecules, but it does not follow that the amoeba can be reconstructed with atoms and molecules. As a matter of fact, the chemist has never succeeded in making an amoeba out of the chemical elements which are to be found in it. Even if we should grant the use of the word evolution to describe the cosmical process by which the material universe came to be what it now is, we must recognize breaks in the continuity. For instance, the evolutionist meets an impassable chasm at the point of transition from the inorganic to the organic. It is easy to conceive in mechanical terms the gradual transition from the particle systems of star dust to the particle systems which are supposed to constitute the human body, but this is not tracing the evolution of man, not even of his body. There is no continuous process conceivable from matter to flesh, from earth to protoplasm, just as there is no continuous process conceivable from the mechanical systems of atoms and molecules to the concrete bodies of the chemical laboratory. It is because the doctrine of evolution undertakes to interpret and explain the natural history process in terms of mechanical situations, that the doctrine is properly described as mechanistic and materialistic.

Thoroughgoing evolutionists who understand their aims and methods are clear and positive that no alien factors such as controlling and directing forces should be allowed to complicate

or vitiate the simple mechanical processes. Some scientists and many others who favor evolution entertain the idea that the process is determined by unknown forces which act from without. But this is not the scientific position. Even if there were such outside forces, their action upon mechanical systems would be inconceivable. Such forces would be absolutely foreign to the situation. The fault of the doctrine of evolution is not that the cause of the process is unknown, but that the mechanical process is inapplicable and useless for the purpose.

In view of the foregoing considerations, it is clear that the doctrine of evolution is mechanistic and materialistic, and on this ground alone it must be rejected as an adequate interpretation of nature. But the doctrine has another aspect which condemns it more specifically.

The doctrine of evolution asserts that there is a continuous process in the course of evolution from protoplasm to man; it undertakes also to declare that all plants and animals can be arranged in genetic order from the lowest forms to the highest. Propagation and growth are explained by the constitution and behavior of the organic cell. Elaborate mechanical theories are constructed to explain the process of heredity. In short, the claim is made that in the doctrine of evolution we have a complete account of the natural history of living beings.

To sum up, by evolution in the strict sense, and also in the widest sense, is meant the process by which the universe has come to be what it is. The truth is, no one except the Creator knows how the universe came about. The whole body of science falls vastly short of being a complete account of the universe. In principle, the theory of evolution proceeds on the assumption that the natural history of the universe is a complete account of it. It is admitted that natural history has not yet reached that stage, nevertheless we cannot look outside of it for further and fuller knowledge. In other words, all real growth in the knowledge of the universe must lie in the progress of natural history. The doctrine of evolution is, therefore, first of all naturalistic. It deliberately and in principle excludes all supernatural factors and agencies. But it is also

naturalistic because of the fundamental principles upon which it rests and proceeds. It begins with the mechanics of particles, it proceeds by mechanical methods, and ends with a mechanical conception of human nature and human conduct. Its first stage is a mechanical particle, its last stage is "Behaviorism." It begins with simple forms of matter and motion, it ends with complex forms. Matter and motion are its ultimate presuppositions. In this, it reverts to the doctrine of early Greek philosophy, the origin and source of all materialism, that the universe is matter and motion, atoms and void.

The doctrine of evolution is a metaphysical doctrine, a doctrine as to the ultimate nature of the universe, and as such it is naturalistic, mechanistic, and materialistic. If it were merely a doctrine about bodies and their behavior, religion and morals might stand aside and let it take its course, but it is specifically a doctrine about the nature of man, and involves his origin and destiny, his character as a moral and spiritual being. It brings man with all his capacities and achievements within its naturalism and materialism. If materialism is the final truth of the universe, then the doctrine of evolution may be true. But if materialism is inconsistent with the fact that it is a metaphysics of the universe, and therefore a product of human thought, then evolution is infected with the inconsistency of being the product of the human mind. We must therefore look outside the evolutionary process for the real nature of the universe and its history. We must look to the nature of mind and its operations, and in the end we must look to the nature of the Supreme Mind, the Creator. The alternative between creation and evolution will be made to appear in the further discussion of this theme in the next issue.

LEWIS F. HITE.

BIBLICAL AND DOCTRINAL STUDIES

THE NAZARETH INAUGURAL;

OR THE LORD'S MINISTRY, AND OURS.

(*Luke* iv. 18, 19)

It would seem that the words from *Isaiah,* in which the Lord found His own ministry described, should give up a great deal of suggestion and inspiration to any Christian minister. He read them one Sabbath to His neighbors and friends in the synagogue at Nazareth, probably at the beginning of His ministry. They were words of course which embodied their liveliest hope and desire. They were words that put with especial beauty the sweetest things which the Messiah would do for them. No wonder that they listened as they never listened again to the Lord as He went on to describe in His interpretation the light, and the liberty, the relief of grief and the squaring of inequality which should be theirs. The ministry He depicted went straight to their deepest needs. The Lord surely did not shape His words of explanation to suit any mistaken expectation of theirs; the ministry-to-be did not engage their mistaken national hopes only, but their undying human necessities. Their wonder turned into amazement, and their eagerness into anger, when He not only took all this ministry on Himself, but charged them with not being eager to turn to Him. But if two or three years later the men who crucified Him knew not what they did, neither did they who failed to hail Him before His ministry was more than begun. I think we can be sure that until a blind spot in them was struck, the ministry which the Lord described to them drew their souls out after Him. We have the incalculable advantage

of looking back into these words through the ministry as it was accomplished by the Lord and as it has been appreciated by the millions who trace their spiritual benefits and life back to it. We know that the words were well taken upon Him by the Lord. Do you think they have always that pull on the heart of the Christian that they had that day in Nazareth? Yet they seem by the Lord to be taken to sum up the work to which He was impelled by the Divine Spirit. He saw His aims put in them. If He has sent us as the Father sent Him, what inspiration and information should flow to us from His peerless ministry for the better doing of ours?

There are some textual matters worth knowing about. It may be that *Luke* quotes the whole of what the Lord read from *Isaiah*. Then of course the Lord stopped short in the chapter in which He was reading. He did not care, it would seem, to go on to say that He came to proclaim "the day of vengeance of our God." That has its suggestions, as has often been noted. But He also dropped away the beautiful words that followed that untoward phrase—

> "to comfort all that mourn;
> "to appoint unto them that mourn in Zion, to give
> unto them beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning,
> the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness;
> that they might be called trees of righteousness,
> the planting of the Lord, that He might be glorified,"

and still other words, all of them equally descriptive of the Lord's ministry-to-be. If *Luke* quotes all the Lord read, we could also keep more nearly exclusively to that Gospel in considering His words. But the Lord may actually have read much farther into the 61st chapter of *Isaiah*. *Luke* may only indicate what the passage was, by starting the quotation of it. One should want the whole of the *Isaiah* passage then before him for study. One should want to work with it primarily, then. On the other supposition one wants it anyway, to throw light on the meaning of the clauses, to determine especially the beneficiaries of each manner of ministry, and the character of each branch of ministry. Of course one can go much farther

afield in Scripture in his inquiry into the meaning of these words. The "poor" appear in many Psalms and in the Prophets. There are the captives of *Psalm* cvii to help with the identification of the captives in *Isaiah* and *Luke*. And so on. As usual in the New Testament, the words in *Luke* represent *Isaiah* in the Septuagint more than in the Hebrew. One clause in *Luke*, although it parallels a clause in *Isaiah*, is not found in the best MSS of the Gospel. That is the clause "to heal the broken-hearted." Another clause as given in *Luke* is in the Septuagint of *Isaiah* but not in the Hebrew, and takes its form more from another passage of *Isaiah* anyway, *Isaiah* xlii.7. That is the clause "and recovering of sight to the blind." And still another clause in *Luke* or in *Luke's* quotation from *Isaiah* lxi is not in that chapter at all. There is one resembling it in *Isaiah* lviii.6. That is the clause "to set at liberty them that are bruised." Quotations from the Old Testament in the New go by affinity of thought more than by continuity of text, as is often observed. There is also no need to be over-rigorous in reading the note, "And He found the place [as though it were only one place] where it was written." We can get at these questions better as we take up a clause at a time. I do not ignore them, but I found that I could say my general comment without regard to them.

One thing which I look forward to our doing is to come at the nature of each branch of ministry named by seeing instances of it in the Lord's recorded ministry. When are we watching Him preaching glad tidings to the poor? When are we looking on as He preaches deliverance to the captives, and so on? This seems the most vital way of identifying the subjects of the ministry described in *Luke's* words. On these beneficiaries of the Lord's ministry I wish to offer a first reflection. However they were to be described in any case, whether as poor, or broken-hearted, captive or oppressed, in all cases we cannot doubt that they came real and vivid to the Lord. He saw them as such. He looked deep into their needs. In that very audience at Nazareth poor, broken-hearted, captive, oppressed, rose up in His vision. Each of these words as

it came on His lips was a peopled utterance. Men and women answering these descriptions not only filled His vision. They tugged at His heart. They drew on His sympathies. They aroused His passion for their well-being. Whoever they were, they came movingly before Him. This then is one thing which His ministry-to-be was marked by and which it suggests any ministry under Him may well be marked by—this sympathetic vision of human beings, seeing to their spirit's need. Are we wrapped up in what we find it interesting to us from Sunday to Sunday to say and do? Are we devoted to a program or scheme of the finest completeness and ideal trend and promise —on paper? Right now are we likely to let the verbal forms of this Nazareth inaugural prescribe us a program instead of letting similar spiritual necessities in our own people spur us to ministry? I know that one thing I need is to see needs, unspoken, even minor needs, in people, and to be set a-longing to help. Is any ministry reaching to its business which does not have this sensitiveness, this distress on account of need, this perceptiveness, so that in un-self-conscious touch it does its work?

The Lord's sympathetic vision was obvious wherever He went. There are a number of very stirring illustrations of it. He looked deep into Peter's impulsive nature, and re-named him after a rock-like quality yet to come. He gazed down into Mary's lavish effusiveness to her grief over His coming death. To me one of the most stirring of these more attractive instances of sympathetic vision has for years been the Lord's approach to Nathaniel. I do not believe that I am trenching on any one's discussion of a branch of ministry. I should hardly know how to classify what the Lord did for Nathaniel in any of the branches of ministry named in the passage in *Luke*. Was Nathaniel a prisoner to self-distrust, and was he set at liberty? Need we regard the branches of ministry named in the Nazareth saying as comprehensive of all that the Lord did? When Philip brings Nathaniel to the Lord, the Lord reads him off. He has read off his aspiration to be a true Israelite. He gives the aspiration full standing.

"Behold," He says, "an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!" How can Jesus know him, down to this secret aspiration of his? The Lord goes on to tell Nathaniel that this aspiration was running high in him as a moment ago he was standing (I suppose in meditation) under "the" fig-tree, which must have been a haunt of his. Now Philip had said this was the Christ. Was it not? Who else could lay this sympathetic hold on his sincerest longing? And what release must have come to Nathaniel's modest aspiration when the Lord encouraged it still more?

Is not this one of the qualities of an inspired ministry? Sympathetic vision of spiritual and moral necessity? Take a typical modern instance of such necessity. When the universe in the tremendous extent of it revealed by science, appears to a man a vast machine remorselessly doing what it is set to do with no feeling in it for these creatures of a day that we seem then, what is our feeling? Suppose the man talks in this fashion:

> In the visible world the Milky Way is a tiny fragment. Within this fragment the solar system is an infinitesimal speck, and of this speck our planet is a microscopical dot. On this dot tiny lumps of impure carbon and water crawl about for a few years, until they dissolve into the elements of which they are compounded.

Even where this is honestly as far as a man sees, do we start on a denunciation of science? It is all true as far as it goes. But what gates of brass, bars of iron, for intelligence, for sympathy, for finesse of soul to try to reach a man through! Yet this is an almost elegant case in comparison with the poor, the handicapped, the wronged, the wrecked, who ought to be putting the Christian ministry in distress to help. Is it a bad thing to let the vision out a little now and then? To let it go in imagination from the one doomed spirit we know, the few unequally dealt with, the occasional great sufferer, to the multitude of the needy in the earth's population? Just to get something of the burden of it, the pull of the mass of it on the heart? *Sympathetic vision of need* is an outstanding characteristic of the ministry described in the words at Nazareth.

I only want to get some of the general force of these words into words of our own. I do not go on to another outstanding characteristic of this ministry, but go next to the fact that it was an inspired ministry. But the point is that not only His was, but any ministry is meant to be an inspired ministry. The same resources are at hand. The works described by the words in Nazareth, bringing good news to the poor, healing the grieving, setting at liberty the imprisoned, and the other works, are all works which the Infinite Love of God has always been doing. They have been its activity from the beginning. They were what the Lord spoke of, when He said His Father had worked theretofore. Now He was at His Father's business. This spirit of the Heavenly Father was upon Him. But so can it be invited upon us, too. When we think of all else that a ministry can be—cultivated, or consecrated, workmanlike, or eloquent, or busy about a hive of good works, it is apparent that we would far rather that it deserved the description "inspired." The "consecrated" ministry can be dull, but the inspired cannot, and is also bound to be consecrated; the "cultivated" can be cold; the "workmanlike" can be too intent on results that can be tabulated; the "eloquent" can be bereft of works; the "busy" can be just that, very busy. The "inspired" is all of these good things and none of these bad. It is a specialty if ever there was one. I think that I can find justification for taking the list of the good works ascribed to the sheep in the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats as a list of the things that all men can be called on to do towards the announcement and extension of the kingdom of heaven. They are lay ministries. But here is a special ministry. It belongs to all, I know, in indirect ministry to drop a word of comfort to the bereaved, and to help an imprisoned spirit out of a hampering habit. But here is a definite ministry at which the Spirit sets some. Not all the ordained, nor any because of ordination, I suppose we all grant. But among the ordained and often outside their number those appear who by gift, by largeness of spirit, by humanity, by vitality of spirit, by discipline of soul, are enabled to do this inspired work. I say

this because I feel that we need to look avidly for the touch of the Spirit on us. We all recall the chapter in "True Christian Religion" on the Holy Spirit, where the especial works of the Spirit with the minister are described. One is the gift of the due spirit for the work of the minister. The man has to submit the whole of himself for "disposition" by the Spirit. It is going to be the whole influence of the man, word, deed, passing contact, atmosphere, which will achieve the fine ministries of the Nazareth inaugural. One cannot treat the work as a job to be done. One cannot think of himself as occupying an office which he can step in and out of. The man is the minister. The Spirit is a personal influence and rests on him; it cannot be wished off on an office. What a difference saying, "I occupy the office of minister," and feeling the burden of the words, unspoken, "The spirit of the Lord is on me." But there is outpouring enough of the Spirit to make every ministry an inspired ministry. It is an inspired ministry to which we are sent if we are sent as the Lord was sent.

A third, and concluding, general comment.

I recall once being in conversation with a particularly hard-headed citizen in the city where I had the pleasantest possible first pastorate. Perhaps at that time I was only making visits there, at the small remuneration per Sunday which the students are still acquainted with. At any rate this hard bargainer that I was in talk with intimated that I was taking something out of the community, but bringing nothing in. That, too, may have been true, even allowing that there are intangible commodities which prosper a community. But I think of Zaccheus. Perhaps you have some idea what the Lord said to that tax-gatherer when he went to dine with him. It is unrecorded that there were any words. Perhaps the Lord's readiness to dine with him in spite of the crowd's condemnation of him touched him. Anyway, in the course of the dinner was it? or on entering the house? Zaccheus stood up, and vowed he would give half his goods to the poor, and restore fourfold what he had extorted from any man. He turned not only just, but generous. (Which of these ministries would

you bring that startling result under?) Now, hundreds of others gained by the effect on Zaccheus of His Divine Visitor. The labor of others was safer. Property was safer. The efforts of hundreds of men were encouraged at the new prospect of fair treatment by the tax-gatherer. To make Zaccheus over was really a highly productive labor!

My last reflection on the Lord's words in Nazareth is that they describe what is *the productive labor* of the minister. The avidity of the audience in Nazareth was proof that any one who would do the things described in the great words from *Isaiah* would be bringing something into Israel. The response of an audience to-day, and more of a congregation, to the same promise in a ministry now is proof that it would be getting something. This is the ministry's productive labor—minds lighted up with a light in which every piece of work is surer to be done with industry, zeal and honesty; grief allayed, which in its inordinateness, can do nothing; human powers awakened and released on goals in life so great that the man's whole strength is brought into play; human spirits lifted over handicaps, and taken past temptations to do what is against the common good; the hands of men energized by the thought that under a Divine care the work of their hands for others, for posterity, towards civilization, can be established on them. All the fine beneficences of the Nazareth platform—who can count them really?—are the true productive labor of the ministry. It is strange how hard it is to keep to the realities even where the professed concern is with the eternal realities. Statistics help obscure them. We can tabulate only evidences of work. There were so many baptisms during the year. So many were received as members into the society. So many were converted to such and such a teaching. So much money was raised for such and such purposes. So many missionary lectures were given. We could wish a greater statistical growth, but we know that these activities may or may not have in their company the true labor of the minister. What does it matter what church is established if the poor are not evangelized, the grief-stricken healed, the captives set at large, the prisoners given

liberty, and these other ministries accomplished which the Lord takes to be the extension of the kingdom? What merit or good in disseminating whatever teachings? Accomplish these goods in and with whatever ecclesiastical body or doctrinal ministration, and one reaches to the ministry's work. It is not within the province of statistics to register here, but how can there fail to be results to register? Can light on the issues of life, beauty, liberty, joy, enter into the spiritual experience of any congregation and nothing come of them? I think of a friend of mine, perhaps better, acquaintance. He had an upbringing of the narrowest kind in the matter of religion, honest and well-intentioned, but terribly cramping and misleading to the mind. Painfully he has had to drop one stout assurance after another which had been ignorantly made to him. The whole presentation of religion to him was ignorant, but absolutely sure. To-day he is a deeply religious spirit, and a man of the most sensitive integrity, but a sorely bruised soul. Any tone of assurance about the deep realities of life throws his whole soul into revolt. The dogmatist sets him quivering at the outrage once done him by his kind. What a sensitiveness to need and what a delicacy of approach one would need to set at liberty this bruised man! What productive labor one could deem it! I hope that as our consideration of these words of the Lord's in Nazareth proceeds, we can put our eyes on this work of constructive effects in the life of the spirit of man, and read our ministry in the terms of the works to which the Lord said that He was impelled by the Spirit. Here are words big with meaning and appeal. As we think them over further, may they become a source of courage, a medium of vision, a fuller discovery of our true service.

WILLIAM F. WUNSCH.

HOMILETICAL SUGGESTIONS FROM THE THEOLOGICAL WORKS.

The Doctrinal Studies in this Department of The REVIEW, like the Bible Studies, have been addressed regularly to the

general reader. Regularly they will be. But from time to time it will be useful probably to offer to the minister and to the ministerial student a piece of study meant peculiarly for him. The Bible Study in this issue is intended for the minister especially, having been done originally for the Committee of Ministers of the Massachusetts Association. The Editor of the Department of Studies has ventured to add a Doctrinal Study with a similar audience in mind, hoping not only that ministers will find these homiletical suggestions from the Theological Works useful, but that they will also care to contribute to these pages occasionally a piece of study intended more especially for their fellow-workers. Suggestions of texts, with some indication of a possible treatment of them; outlines of sermons on timely and vital themes; close studies of Bible texts; pertinent interpretation and application of great teachings of the Church; any or all of these would make profitable contributions of this limited and occasional character to the Department of Studies of The Review. We trust that a number of ministers will be moved to contribute in this way to the stimulation of their fellow-workers in their especial field.

At the moment what we think to proffer is a few suggestions for sermon work from the Theological Works.

In the large, constant and most substantial way the Theological Works are pouring out homiletic material on us right along, of course. Staple for the sermon is there. It is there for the sermon of guidance to thought, in the re-constructed Christian teaching of those Works. We preach the teaching set forth in the Theological Works, as it is to be drawn from Scripture, and can be rested in Scripture. Endless material is there for the expository sermon, in the expositions in those Works of the deepest meanings of Scripture. What an abundance of homiletic matter is to be found there for the ministry of comfort in the disclosures in those Works on the life to come! It goes without saying that the Theological Works, opening up the Scriptures, are an inexhaustible source of sermonic material.

But at the moment we are interested to suggest some lesser

and more limited but fertile ways in which the Theological Works give up useful hints to the preacher. At times they suggest a whole outline of thought on a topic. Or they may arm the preacher with that particular pictorial turn to the thought which will give pointedness and memorableness to his sermon. They may suggest a sermon-title that is striking. Few ministers have failed to find that they invest with force and sense some verse or saying in Scripture of which they had begun to despair of making anything. It is homiletic suggestions of this order, suggestions of form, and argument, and pointedness, that we are thinking to proffer. The substance of one's preaching lies, of course, in one form in the Scriptures, and in another in the Theological Works, but in addition these Works can give one (as the Bible does, and is more likely to do) hints about the manner of treatment of a teaching, or even furnish one striking titles, or the illustration in which the point of the sermon is carried off by the listener.

1. The ministerial student can gain from the Theological Works fairly substantial suggestions for the treatment of an idea. Take the theme, "It is not so difficult to live the life which the Lord would have us live." The Theological Works are not the first to propound the theme, of course. The Scriptures offer it to us over and over. Perhaps we are using for text, "For My yoke is easy, and My burden is light" (*Matthew* xi. 30). But the Theological Works make a certain treatment of the thought possible, and actively put that treatment of it in our way. They guard us, in the first place, against minimizing the difficulty of the spiritual life. Certainly they say enough about all that one must do to have that life. They lay a peculiar emphasis on our need of a vision and knowledge of the spiritual life, and on our regenerative struggles. By way of introduction the preacher will guard against making too little of the difficulty of the spiritual life. When he goes on to urge his main thought of the naturalness of the spiritual life, the Theological Works suggest a form for treatment of it. *a*) The spiritual life is not the unnatural life it has so often been taken to be. It is not the renunciation of a full-bodied

and eager life here, which has its own satisfactions and objects. The latter is caught up in the former, or is its outward presentment. *b*) Again it is not so difficult to live the spiritual life because neither is it unnatural in the sense that it is "pietistic" or "religious." It does not consist in prayers, church services, even Bible reading, but in the active life, with its whole and wholesome round of interests, inspired as that can be by these aids. The spiritual life is human, not ecclesiastic. *c*) Again the spiritual life is not so difficult because it comes, after all, by a natural enough step, when in the fulness of human motive and ideal one adds to the moral life and the life of the true citizen the purposes of one who looks beyond the life of this world. What he does anyway, he has only to do with a thought for God and in recognition of his relation to his fellow. *d*) There is a fourth assignable reason why it is not so difficult as it might be or is sometimes imagined, to live the life of heaven. That is, that that life is nothing we create. We do not need really to bring it about. It is something we only need to give ourselves up to. It is always seeking for expression by us, and striving to have us. It exists, and only wants further instruments and servants. . . This is only to indicate how the Theological Works offer us a treatment of a theme which is sufficiently homiletical and practical for use as it stands.

2. A second class of suggestion,—there frequently leaps out at one from the pages of the Theological Works a striking title for a sermon. I recall how I was first struck with the phrase "Life Open from the Lord." We are familiar enough with the thought of life's being open *to* the Lord. He knows our ways from afar off, and is aware of the word which has not left our tongue. Our nature is open to His scrutiny, and to His judgment. But this is a different idea. Life may also be open *from* the Lord. There is such a thing as an inner life so unimpaired in powers, or so unclogged by the misconceived and the misfelt that the Lord's life streams into one, full, sound, all the way His, open from Him. He enters the will and occupies it, and moves on into a man's action. He has the

freedom of that man's house of life. What an ideal it is! "Life Open from the Lord!" The idea may not be original with the Theological Works, except in the context they give it, but the phrase seems to be, in which the thought is pithily summed up. "Born in the House" is another provocative sermon-title, a Scripture phrase, of course, but given a fresh force in such a Scripture interpretation as that in "Arcana," n. 1708e. Or there is the striking, "The Lord and the Empty Man," again going back to Scripture, but invested with a fresh meaning in "Arcana," n. 10645(3) and elsewhere. In one respect one must be empty, in another one must not be empty to go availingly to the Lord. Or, "Evil is Stupid," often enough said in some Psalms, but the uncompromising words put it incisively. The more perceptive preacher, gifted with a little poetry, could make much of such a title as "The Distances of Truth" (Divine Love and Wisdom, n. 7). A sermon of a rightly revivalistic turn and power is invited by the thought of a "dead man's bonds." "Are Yours the Bonds of a Dead Man?" Again the preacher would want to guard his theme sensibly, and give due place to those props of society and of order, fear of the loss of reputation, fear of punishment, fear of disease, and all the other restraints which fortunately we do feel. Things would go worse were it not for these constraints on us, and others like them. But after all they are the bonds that restrain the man not alive to conscience, to scruple, to truth, to the Lord's demand on him as a Christian. They are bonds that restrain the man spiritually dead. One can at least imagine a strong sermon preached under this vivid title, "Are Yours the Bonds of a Dead Man?", urging men to rise to the life of the spirit, and to a control of themselves worthy of them, and indeed necessary to them, as undying spirits.

3. To the preacher who goes up and down in the Theological Works, seeking thought or homiletic suggestion of any sort which he can utilize, many a phrase is tantalizing. He cannot await the day when it will come to him naturally to be used in illustration of his thought in a sermon, or in making the

point of his sermon striking or memorable. The word "Doors," for example, as the Theological Works use it not only of such gates to our consciousness as the senses, but of higher powers, like the "rationality" and "liberty" of the Doctrines, that two-leaved door of the inmost spirit of man, where life knocks for admission. It is throwing away vividness to preach on these or other powers of the soul, and not give people the sense of mysterious doors which can open on great happenings and to a glorious Guest. The figure in "True Christian Religion," n. 504, of the actuation and guidance of human free agency, as "The Divine Finger on the Scale-beam," has always seemed to me to be asking for a sermon in which it might be embodied to pictorialize the thought. "A Diamond Dropped into a Marsh" is a comparison which one feels must come very fit to one's hand some time. Once in a while Swedenborg drops into language and even into forms of thought which come from his acquaintance with the classic mythologies. In these days anything like a persisting world of malignant evil seems not to weigh heavily on the Christian consciousness, but in "Conjugial Love," n. 504, Swedenborg says of certain men that "the Divine Nemesis pursues them," as though he subscribed after all to the idea of a Divine vengeance. At least the use of these words rebukes the preaching that cannot make plain and dreadful the heavy lot of transgression. I am only pointing to a rhetorical usefulness of the Theological Works to the preacher here. One of the most highly rhetorical passages in the Theological Works is that charming and enthusiastic passage in the posthumous "Doctrine of Charity" in which the Revelator describes first "goodness before repentance" and then "goodness after repentance." That passage is enough, not only to furnish an apt phrase or two, but to give one such a longing to set forth "goodness in its wholeness" and beauty and real appeal that it is the finest kind of homiletical aid, namely, inspiration. Or take such words as the following from "True Christian Religion." The very essence of preaching is in them, just as the heart of the Christian Gospel is.

Conjunction with an invisible God is like that of the eye's vision with

the expanse of the universe, of which it sees no end; it is also like vision in mid-ocean, which falls on air and sea and is lost. But conjunction with the visible God, on the other hand, is like seeing a man in the air on the sea, spreading forth his hands and inviting to his arms. n. 787.

The Editor of the Department of Studies proffers this slight comment on the homiletical suggestiveness of the Theological Works in the hope that his ministerial brethren will be moved to send studies of theirs in description and employment of the many homiletical aids which the Theological Works extend us (beside that substantial yield which we all depend on, in their doctrinal and expository material). These studies, meant for the minister, will appear only in an occasional REVIEW; they can be made useful and varied, however, only if a number will contribute their suggestions.

WILLIAM F. WUNSCH.

CURRENT LITERATURE

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HEBREW WORD.*

This is a new departure—a book on Hebrew written entirely from the New-Church standpoint; a book, therefore, of special interest to New-Church people. That it will appeal to others is hardly to be expected, seeing that it is an attempt to combine the teaching of Hebrew grammar with the teaching of New-Church doctrine, so as to make the one illustrate and enforce the other. As such, it is an interesting experiment, and one that may be capable of considerable development in the future.

The book is intended for beginners and even for school-children, though it is admitted in the Preface that it contains passages which will not be well understood by such children—a statement with which, after perusal of the work, we fully agree. This will not matter, however, so long as the teacher is at hand to give the needed explanations.

In the first chapter there are some remarks on the uncorrupt state of our present Hebrew Bible, that may possibly be challenged by scholars as not in agreement with the facts. Indeed, a well known member of our own body, the late Rev. Samuel Noble, had a good deal to say on this very subject, in certain articles he published in the *Intellectual Repository* as far back as 1823. After careful enquiry he reached the conclusion that no individual copy in his day contained the text of the Hebrew Word in all its original integrity; and that seems to be the general view today.

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* *An Introduction to the Study of the Hebrew Word.* By ALFRED ACTON, M.A., B.TH. Bryn Athyn, Pa.: Academy Book Room. 1925. 320 pp., 8vo. Cloth, $4.00

In the early chapters, commencing with Chapter III, the novel plan is adopted of getting the learner to read Hebrew words and phrases, and even to translate short sentences, practically without rules and before all the letters of the alphabet have been learnt. The grammatical rules of course follow, but are introduced very gradually and are immediately applied, so that the learner remembers them chiefly in the form of concrete examples. This method ought to lessen the dryness of which beginners in Hebrew so often complain.

Another novel feature is the introduction of the Hebrew accents quite early (at Chapter VII), evidently with a view to facilitating the early reading of the Word in the original. Usually the student is not initiated into the accentual system (which is intricate) until much later. The exercises given are very full, and introduce numerous passages from Scripture—in fact, the final section consists solely of such passages, some of them being complete Psalms.

One long chapter (Chapter xxx) is devoted to an interesting explanation and discussion of the various Hebrew names of God; but, strangely enough, the present-day assumed pointing and pronunciation of Jehovah as *Yahweh,* is not even mentioned. The pronunciation *Jehovah* (according to Brown's Lexicon) was unknown prior to A.D. 1520, when it was first introduced by Galatinus, the Catholic theologian and orientalist..

In reading the book through, we have noticed several inaccuracies in the Hebrew pointing, and a few in the consonants, some of them merely printer's errors, but others, seemingly slips of the pen. These would no doubt be corrected in a subsequent edition.

The whole work, which is in excellent type (printed, by the way, by the Jewish Publication Society Press of Philadelphia), concludes with Hebrew and English vocabularies, and with separate indexes to the passages quoted from Swedenborg and from Scripture. Altogether a thoughtful and interesting book.

A. PRESCOTT HILLER.

LESSONS ON NATURE TOPICS.

This series of four booklets * consists of lessons in correspondences and interpretation thereby of the Divine Word. The four separate parts might well be bound together to form one volume, as indeed was evidently intended should be done, since the paging is consecutive throughout the series. There are forty-four chapters or lessons, each treating of one or more subjects, so that the whole range of correspondences in the Word is well covered, though in many instances very briefly. The fixing of exact calendar dates for each week's lesson from Oct. 5, 1924 to Sept. 27, 1925 served its purpose for one particular year, but no doubt such dating will be omitted in any future edition.

One does not turn to these lessons expecting to find anything startlingly new or sensational. Nor does the author claim for himself any special originality in either the selection or treatment of his subjects, but makes graceful and grateful acknowledgment of his indebtedness to "the pioneer work of Rev. John Worcester on 'Correspondences of the Bible.'" Nevertheless, there are in our author's pages many interesting scientific facts, historical references, literary allusions and quotations not found in other works of the kind, which add very much to the value of his book. Moreover, each of the chapters, with its methodical arrangement and clear sub-headings, is admirably adapted both to private study and to class-instruction. The style is in keeping with the best tradition of our British brethren—clear and incisive, not too sermonic, not too doctrinal for any layman, young or old, to enjoy reading. Interspersed among hundreds of useful references to the Doctrines are enough Scripture passages to show the student that the interpretations given are drawn from the very Word itself, and not from the vain imaginings of any human mind and heart.

As every experienced student of the science of correspon-

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* *Lessons on Nature Topics from the Word; For Young People.* By THE REV. J. G. DUFTY. Manchester: New-Church Sunday School Union. 1924. 263 pp., 12mo, in four parts paged continuously. Each part in paper cover, 40 cents.

dences knows, success in interpreting the Word by means of them depends largely on the correct use of specific terms. The terms "truth" and "good" mean very little to any one unless some specific way in which truth or good manifests itself is brought to his attention. There are countless myriads of forms of truth and good; and our problem in treating of these subjects, in trying to study out their meanings and make them clear, is to find out how those myriads of form differ from one another,—how, for example, the correspondence of rock differs from that of the metals, or the correspondence of the red, red rose from that of the white, white lily. Our author is to be congratulated on having avoided so many of the pitfalls that are encountered in the use of terms whenever anyone tries to express the realities of the spiritual world in natural language. From the study of smallest insect to ponderous pacyderm, from the study of tiny flower in crannied wall to the all-embracing concept of the Maximus Homo, Mr. Dufty tells us something of what God and man is. With hearty commendation we greet another brother-student in the Church, sincerely seeking to interpret the Word of God by the law of correspondence. CHAUNCEY G. HUBBELL.

BIBLE PLAYS FOR SUNDAY SCHOOLS.

More and more effort is being made to teach the Bible stories by dramatization; more and more study is being given to promoting self-expression in the children of to-day. "The Wooing of Rebekah and Other Bible Plays," by Rosamond Kimball,* who is a member of the Orange New-Church Society, is a collection of eleven Bible stories arranged for dramatic performance by children from three to eighteen years of age. "The purpose of the book" to quote the author, "is to enable young people to *live out* the Bible, thus transforming it from an intellectual experience into a life experience." This desirable result is brought about by having the dialogue in the Bible's own words. Where no dialogue appears in the Bible

* *The Wooing of Rebekah, and Other Bible Plays.* By ROSAMOND KIMBALL. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1925.

text, a reader carries the story forward, the action being given in pantomime; and when neither of these methods is possible and additional dialogue must be inserted, great care has been taken to keep as close as may be to the Bible language. The problems of staging have been worked out on such simple lines that any Sunday school may give these plays. All are arranged so that they may be produced in the chancel as "dramatic services." Five of them may be presented effectively out of doors. The plays are "The Wooing of Rebekah," "Jacob's Journey," "The Story of Joseph," "Moses in the Bulrushes," "Ruth," "Samuel in House of the Lord," "David and Jonathan," "Elijah and Elisha," "The Nativity," "The Prodigal Son" and "The Resurrection." Three of these are suitable to give in sections. If the children are studying the lesson, which extends over several weeks, one scene may be given at the end of each period, with an assembling of all the acts at the end, for the benefit of the society or community. The author's "Introduction" is an inspiration. The "method of training" the children, so that they may come to *"live"* their parts, and may be "filled" with the sense of the "sacredness and meaning of it all," is clearly set forth. Some interesting experiences, as illustrating the method, are mentioned. Practical suggestions are given for the director and her assistants in the several departments. There are a few general directions about lighting, costumes and properties, as well as about the choosing of characters and the reader. All the plays are accompanied by music; and selections have been chosen for victrola or organ, making it possible for anyone to procure proper music, at a very small cost, with which to create the right atmosphere. In the Christmas service, "The Nativity," two chants from our own Book of Worship are appended for those who might not be able to find them readily. Also, three selections from Bach are given, for "The Resurrection." Eight beautiful illustrations present the idea of costume and grouping.

Only one unfavorable criticism comes to mind. Three of the plays have utterances by "The Voice of the Lord," and one by "The Voice of Jesus." There is the risk of producing an un-

pleasant reaction here, as no human voice *can* express the love and majesty which the imagination demands. With this one objection, which can be overcome by having the reader continue the rendering, the book stands as the best collection of Bible plays which has come to our attention. It should be owned by every Sunday school wishing to give this living quality to the "letter of the Word"—the quality which comes from sight and hearing, and from trying to "live" some Bible character in the play. LILYBELL BATES.

"MYSTIC GEMS."*

In a book bearing the significant title "Mystic Gems," one should not look for scientific information, but rather for that of a superstitious and legendary sort such as may be found scattered throughout the imaginative and fanciful literature of the ages. The miscellaneous character of the contents in this instance is indicated by Miss Forbes's acknowledgment "to everyone who ever wrote a line on the subject"; which acknowledgment implies wide reading on her part, and incidental culling of such matter as interested her in connection with the consideration of the gems traditionally known as birthstones. After a brief preface on the subject of such stones, we find twelve short chapters in the order of the months of the year, each devoted to setting forth a chaotic assortment of information, regardless of reliability, concerning its special gem.

The volume has thirteen full page illustrations: a colored frontispiece representing "a scarab bracelet of mystic gems"; and twelve uncolored plates, one to each chapter according to subject, representing for the most part cut and set gems of its special kind, usually in the form of necklaces. In our judgment the illustrations add very little to the general interest of the book, as they impart but trifling information of the kind one naturally desires. A single colored plate, such as is found in some dictionaries, would have served the purpose much better. B. A. WHITTEMORE.

* *Mystic Gems.* By HARRIET KEITH FOBES. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1924. 117 pp., 8vo., illus. Boards, $3.00.

WHAT EVOLUTION IS.*

There is such confusion in the public mind as to just what evolution is, and there is so much exaggeration as to the importance of evolution, that a brief, clear, readable book on this subject is very much needed. Professor Parker has met these requirements in a simple, uncritical way quite satisfactorily. He begins with a short historical sketch, which carries the idea of evolution back to the primitive notion of the kinship of man with animals, and cities totems as a case in point. He cites Anaximander as an early instance of the idea of evolution in the scientific sense. He naturally refers to the part which Lamarck took in the formulation of the modern doctrine, and gives the usual place of importance to the work of Charles Darwin.

Quite characteristically and properly, he contrasts evolution with the doctrine of creation. He notes that Linnæus and Cuvier, the greatest naturalists of the period, held to the doctrine of creation, especially the creation of each separate species. With the appearance of "Vestiges of Natural History of Creation," by Robert Chambers in 1844, and Darwin's "Origin of Species" in 1859, together with Huxley's vigorous offensive campaign, the weight of Cuvier's authority was lifted, the doctrine of creation shelved, and the evolutionistic propaganda swept the field.

Doctor Parker's moderation avoids the flamboyant assertion that evolution is known to be a fact by every well informed and competent person; nor does he parade the usual distinction between the knowledge of the fact of evolution, and a knowledge of the causes of evolution, or the processes by which evolution has come about; he nevertheless makes this distinction the basis of his treatment.

After some brief introductory and historical remarks, there follows the main body of his book—two chapters headed respectively "Evidence of Evolution" and "Factors in Evolution." The former undertakes to give the evidence to show

* *What Evolution Is.* By GEORGE HOWARD PARKER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1925. 177 pp., 16mo. Cloth, $1.50.

that evolution is a fact; the latter discusses the factors of evolution, that is, the processes by which evolution has been brought about. The evidence is taken as usual from comparative anatomy, from embryology, from geology, from Zoögeography, and from rudimentary organs. These several lines of evidence are recited with the usual admixture of fact and fiction; illustrative and typical cases are given; and the argument is rounded out by urging the concurrence and convergence of all the different lines. It is significant, of course, that even when stripped of theory and conjecture, and limited to bare statement of fact, these do exhibit serial order both in organic and temporal relations. This feature is taken as a positive refutation of the doctrine of creation. It is presumable, however, that if creation is a fact, the process would be adapted to the character of the environment, and that this would involve a serial order, perhaps identical with that which is observed.

In summing up, the author emphasizes the assertion that "every biologist of any standing whatsoever" or "practically all biologists today" . . . . . "accept without any reservations descent with modification as an actual occurrence in nature" (p. 62). At the same time, these biologists have no "clear and unequivocal answer" to the question how evolution takes place. But "because biologists have not as yet discovered how evolution takes place is no reason for denying evolution itself." That is to say, evolution itself is a well established fact, but there is as yet no generally accepted explanation of the fact. This is the distinction between evolution as a fact and evolution as the process by which the fact was brought about. As to the processes by which evolution was brought about, we have Lamark's "inheritance of acquired characters," Darwin's "natural selection," "mutations," or the sudden appearance of differences between parent and offspring, as championed by De Vries and others. All these processes are set aside for various reasons as inadequate to explain the fact of evolution. In other words, none of these processes, nor all of them together, are identical with the process of

genetic dependence. All this amounts to saying that we agree to think of evolution as a fact, but we are compelled to admit that there is no such known process. Clear thinking allows us to say only that evolution is a theory, for which certain lines of questionable evidence may be produced. If we are inclined to accept the evidence we do so; if not, we may be critical, and may make a distinction between fact and fancy.

The final chapter, on "Human Applications," qualifies in some respects, and to some extent contradicts, the doctrine of evolution as applied to animals. This, however, is due to the appearance in man of certain higher powers than are possessed by the lower animals. Evolution in the case of man is controlled and directed to certain ends, whether in accordance with or opposed to the order of nature in the kingdoms below man. But up to this point, the point of rational control and direction, man has evolved just as other animals from earlier forms. The usual series of the Pithecanthropus, Eoanthropus, Neanderthal, and Cro-Magnon, is exhibited to show the line of man's descent from an ape-like ancestor. On the basis of this evidence, a few fossil specimens widely separated in space and time, we are assured "that man has descended from an ape-like stock, no reasonable person can doubt." This subjection to propaganda is almost ludicrous when we bear in mind that the fossil Pithecanthropus is separated from the Eoanthropus by 250,000 years, and the latter from the Neanderthal by 150,000; and even the Cro-Magnon is separated from his ancestors by 75,000 years. This impression is intensified when we investigate the histories of these specimens, and find that they are almost pure fictions, "reconstructions" from a very few bone-like fossils, which, in some cases at least, may indicate men or monkeys, as we are predisposed. This chapter of evolutionistic paleontology is instructive, because it is typical of evolutionistic thought and inference.

The title of the book is quite appropriate, if we take it as referring to the present status of the doctrine of evolution; but it is a misnomer, if we take it as indicating a matter-of-fact

account of the grounds on which the belief in evolution is based.

We recommend the book as readable, but not as conclusive.

LEWIS F. HITE.

"RELIGIOUS VALUES." *

In his recent volume Dr. Brightman, whose interests lie in the interterritorial study of philosophy and religion, has brought together several groups of essays, all in a general way *apologiæ* for religion from the point of view of the technical metaphysician. From the start, therefore, the book labors under handicaps. Its audience is not clearly defined. The metaphysicians, all except Dr. Brightman's own little group of "personalists," will think the work vitiated by its obvious theological *animus;* the unmetaphysical orthodox, or ninety-nine per cent of them, will find baffling and not "helpful" the metaphysics and metaphysical controversies constantly in the background and frequently in the foreground of the author's mind. Naturalists and humanists may take Dr. Brightman's theism as an irritating affectation, unbecoming in one so learned and in other respects so abreast of his times; but it is hardly conceivable that either orthodox Protestants, evangelical "Bible Christians," or orthodox Catholics, Church Christians, can take very lasting satisfaction in a defence of religion by an unattached theist whose creed comes rather from his reason and his faith than from Bible or Church. In truth, our learned author is a sort of Athanasius *contra mundum;* and perhaps many of all "schools" may find it in them to regret that powers so considerable should be spent upon a cause so futile. Surely the world—which is not capable of fine distinctions and nice balancing of arguments —will presently find religion either much more or much less than "unattached" theism.

The point of view, as has been said, is not clearly defined. Such a chapter as "Religious Values and Recent Philosophy,"

* *Religious Values.* By EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1925. 285 pp. 8vo. Cloth, $2.50.

an admirably lucid summary of the anti-religious bias of the author's professional contemporaries, seems to attempt professional refutation; yet before this course has been pursued to its completion, the author is reminded that his book is to bear the imprint of a denominational publishing house, and will no doubt be bought by many devout Christians under the assumption that it is "helpful" reading: it is therefore necessary to cross from the desk to the pulpit. The rapidity of these transitions distresses the sensitive reader. He is glad of both instruction and edification, but he likes, too, purity of *genre:* he wants to judge argument as argument.

Nevertheless, the small circle of readers capable of studying Dr. Brightman's writings—those who feel the necessity for keeping hold of both their philosophy and their religion, theists, catholic-minded humanists to whom nothing human can be alien and to whom the "faith of the millions" must always be of profound interest—this small circle will find much to delight and profit them. Man and book evidence extensive and intensive learning, acquaintance with and fairness to schools of thought deeply antagonistic, clear analysis, comprehensive "synopsis". The view of religion presented is, on the whole, a balanced and inclusive view. The institutional side of religion and the theological side are, some may justly feel, too much neglected; but there is in turn emphasized the necessity for the Logical Basis of Religious Belief, the Moral Basis of Religious Values, the Human Values of Religion, and More-than-Human Values. The volume includes three excellent chapters on the Philosophy of Worship that were first delivered as lectures before the Lowell Institute of Boston.

AUSTIN WARREN.

"THE CURRICULUM OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION."*

The reader must not expect to find in this book a developed curriculum of religious education; he finds rather a discussion

* *The Curriculum of Religious Education.* By PROF. WILLIAM CLAYTON BOWER. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1925. 283 pp., 12mo., Cloth, $2.25.

of the principles which in the opinion of the author must govern in the formation of a curriculum in keeping with the new ideas of religious education. The author tells us that the actual creation of a curriculum must be preceded by patient research and wide-spread experimentation. This research is in progress; and in the mean time not much can be published but a statement of the problems and principles involved.

An historical sketch reviews the principles which have successively governed the formation of curricula in the past, when the purpose of education was conceived to be the discipline of the faculties, the acquisition of knowledge, study of individual development as reflected in the development of the race. We are told now to think of the curriculum as enriched and controlled experience. This leads to consideration of the nature of experience, the kinds of experience which may be useful, and the ways of using experience in religious education.

One's thought runs back to the principle long recognized by educators, that expression is a necessary part of the process of learning, and to the place which has been given in courses of study to expressional activities. In programs of religious teaching, those activities have usually been disappointing, as being inadequate and artificial. One examines the use of the "project" principle in secular and religious education, the "learning by doing" method, and still feels that experiences are too often artificial and remote from the child's normal experience. It is refreshing to find that the builders of the new curriculum are sensitive to the artificiality of past methods, and recognize that the experiences of the curriculum shall be real and normal experiences.

In his preface and elsewhere our author expresses such ideas as the following:

> Until a way can be found for the teaching of morals and religion as a part of the experience of normal life, there must remain a doubt as to the practicability of teaching morals or religion at all.

> The fundamental element in the curriculum as enriched and controlled experience will consist of a selected and organized body of actual experiences of children, young people and adults.

The first consideration is that these experiences shall be real.

Much of this instruction in later years has consisted of "expressional" work which has followed instruction, and which has seldom carried the application of moral and religious truth beyond artificial activities. If moral and religious education is to effect changes in human life, it cannot be carried on with this sort of procedure.

With Jesus religion was a way of life, and the only way one could become religious was by actually living life religiously.

All this is sound, and leads one to watch with interest the development of a curriculum along these lines.

WM. L. WORCESTER.

ANOTHER BOOK ON THE GOSPELS.*

There is much in Canon Streeter's "Four Gospels," which we should like to bring to the attention of the REVIEW's readers; but limited space compels our passing over all but those chapters which deal with the Third and the Fourth Gospels.

It was noticed long ago, especially by Sir John Hawkins, that certain large sections of the Gospel of Luke are wholly foreign to that of Mark. Hawkins spoke of these non-Marcan sections as "interpolations"; but Canon Streeter objects to that term, and argues that they, with certain other passages in the Gospel, formed a primitive Evangel, somewhat longer than Mark, and of approximately the same date—about the year 60 A.D. Of this primitive Gospel he believes that about 250 verses came from a source that was used also by the author of the First Gospel; the rest, from the distinctively Lucan source. This earlier Luke, he calls "Proto Luke." He has reconstructed this "Proto Luke"; and the result is a fairly complete Gospel, beginning, like Mark, with the Baptism and the Temptation, and ending with a brief account of the Crucifixion, the Entombment, and the Resurrection.

It is impossible, here, to review the detailed arguments offered

* *The Four Gospels.* By CANON B. H. STREETER. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1925. 597 pp., 12mo. Cloth, $3.50.

as proof of this theory; but they are numerous and certainly appear to carry considerable weight. Whether true or not, the theory is thought-provoking. If the Canon be correct we have embedded in the Gospel of Luke as we have it to-day, a document as old as the oldest of our four Gospels.

The chapters dealing with the Fourth Gospel are equally suggestive, especially perhaps to New-Churchmen. Swedenborg has drawn largely upon this Gospel for his Scripture citations. More than once the present writer has heard the objection raised to some "proof-text" of Swedenborg's, "O, that is in the Fourth Gospel!" There has been a considerable change of attitude towards this Gospel of late; yet no "critic" of note now considers it historical; and few if any authorities would admit its Johannean authorship.

Canon Streeter frankly recognizes these difficulties, and assigns its authorship to "John the Elder," admitting the possibility, if not probability, that John the Apostle was martyred shortly after the outbreak of the Jewish War in 66 A.D. The Canon thoroughly sifts the evidence concerning this "John the Elder," and shows how readily he might have been confused with John the Apostle, at a time when apostolicity and canonicity were practically synonymous. More than this, however, he discusses, at some length, the mental attitude of the Fourth Evangelist, whoever he was. In him we have a thorough fusion of Hellenic and Hebraic modes of thought. He is at once mystic and prophet, according to Streeter:

> The author of the Fourth Gospel stands between two worlds, the Hebrew and the Greek. . . . In him Plato and Isaiah meet.

All this helps us to understand why the discourses of "John" are so different from the discourses of the Synoptics. The authors of the latter worked with the Jewish literary tadition—the preservation of the Master's *ipsissima verba*.

> [The Fourth Evangelist, in line with Greek literary tradition, never] intended the speeches put into the month of Christ to be taken as a verbatim report, or even a précis of the actual words spoken by Him on the particular occasions on which they are represented as having been delivered. . . . They are interpretations, rather than *ipsissima*

verba of the historic Jesus, *but they have come to him through the quick inspiration* from the risen Christ Himself. That is why he insists, "The Spirit shall lead you into all truth."

From these hasty summaries and brief quotations it may be seen how valuable a work, from the "critics'" standpoint, the Canon has produced. Liberal yet not ultra-radical, frank yet reverent, it is a book which may well find a place on every clergyman's bookshelves.

FRANK H. ANDREW.

"THE CHILDREN'S BIBLE."*

Sherman and Kent's "Children's Bible" was originally issued three years ago as a large octavo book of 329 pages, large type, with thirty full-page illustrations, half of them in color and half in duotone. Our review of that volume appeared in October, 1922. Evidently the sales of the book have been extensive, so that the publishers have thought best, as in so many cases, to issue a cheaper edition in order to reach a less affluent and more numerous public; but in this case, instead of printing from the plates of the original edition, they have had the work entirely reset in smaller type (this making the text run to 419 pages), have reduced the size of the trimmed page to duodecimo, and have retained only nine of the illustrations, but one of them in color. Both forms of the book are now on the market, the recent edition at one-half the price of the former.

After these remarks about the differences of the two editions, there is practically nothing to add to what we said three years ago. At that time we remarked that the chief objection many persons would have to the volume would be the fact that the selections are newly translated, and therefore the elderly reader's sensibilities may be offended by lack of the old, familiar terminology. We were unable then to mention any similar vol-

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* *The Children's Bible.* COMPILED AND TRANSLATED BY HENRY A. SHERMAN AND CHARLES FOSTER KENT. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1925. 419 pp., 12mo., illus. (Popular Edition.) Cloth, $1.75.

ume that retained the translation of the Authorized Version; but that need has quite recently been met by a compilation by Arthur Mee (a Christian worker well-known in England), published by Hodder & Stoughton of London (American agents, George H. Doran & Co., of New York). This also bears the title, "The Children's Bible." It is a thick octavo volume of 474 pages, containing nearly twice as much material as the American publication of the same name. It is finely illustrated with seventy duotone pictures "from the art galleries of the world." The price is three dollars.

B. A. WHITTEMORE.

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WM. L. WORCESTER.

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* *The Religion of Undergraduates.* By CYRIL HARRIS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1925. 87 pp., 12mo. $1.25.

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